Defying Precedent: Can Abenaki Aboriginal Title Be Extinguished by the  Weight of History ? by Bergman, Gene
American Indian Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 2
1-1-1993
Defying Precedent: Can Abenaki Aboriginal Title
Be Extinguished by the "Weight of History"?
Gene Bergman
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gene Bergman, Defying Precedent: Can Abenaki Aboriginal Title Be Extinguished by the "Weight of History"?, 18 Am. Indian L. Rev. 447
(2018),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/4
DEFYING PRECEDENT: CAN ABENAKI
ABORIGINAL TITLE BE EXTINGUISHED BY
THE "WEIGHT OF HISTORY"?
Gene Bergman*
Thus ends the account of the St. Francis Indians, the remnant of
a great tribe.., whose story is closely connected with the hills
and valleys, with the rivers and streams of our own town, and
especially with the village known long ago as Missisquoi. Of
those who gave name to our beautiful river, we are now almost,
within a few years we may, alas! be wholly able to say, with
literal exactness:
"They have all passed away,
The noble and the brave;
Their light canoes have vanished
From off the crested wave.
But, their name is on our waters,
We may not wash it out."'
Introduction
The Abenaki supposedly disappeared from Vermont a long time ago.2 Yet
reports of their departure were greatly exaggerated. Historical and anthropo-
logical studies have shown that the Abenaki never left Vermont; instead, they
* Third-year student, Vermont Law School. B.A., 1987, University of Vermont. Member,
Vermont Law Sclwol Law Review. The author wishes to thank Professor Bruce Duthu, Greg
Eaton, Eric D. Jones, John Moody, and the author's patient family.
Third place winner, 1992-93 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. George Barney & John B. Perry, History of Swanton, in 4 THE VERMONT IIISTORICAL
GAZETEER 933, 1001 (Montpelier, Vt., Abby M. Hemenway 1882). The Missisquoi River flows
into Lake Champlain near the Canadian border in northwestem Vermont, emptying into the large
Missisquoi Bay which spans the Canadian-United States border at the forty-fifth degree north
latitude.
2. See Dorothy C. Fisher, The Settlers, in REPRINTS FROM VERMONT HISTORY 14, 17 (Vt.
Historical Society ed., 1975) Fisher tells the story of Vermont through epic-like stories. Here,
a mythical Vermonter is asked by mythical settlers about the danger posed by "Injuns." The
Vermonter encourages the settlers to stay in Vermont by responding: "No Indians in the Grants
at all. Only just a few that come and go with their families to hunt and fish. They're Abnakis
[sic], anyhow, not Iroquois. They're decent folks." Id. at 17; see also WALTER H. CROCKEIT,
VERMONT: THE GREEN MOUNTAIN STATE (Fireside Forum ed., 1938). Crockett described the
Abenaki presence in Vermont in terms of Indian war raids. He believed that Indians resided in
the Missisquoi region "until the white men settled here." Id. at 51. He mentions no date but
implies that the 1759 raid by Rogers Rangers on the Abenaki reservation at St. Francis, Quebec,
marked the effective end of Abenaki presence in Vermont. Id. at 31-116.
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have been present in their historic Vermont Missisquoi-Swanton-Highgate
homelands continuously from 9300 B.C. until today? For the past twenty
years, a resurgent Abenaki Tribal Council has asserted Abenaki pride and
rights, often engaging in acts of civil disobedience Abenaki-Vermont
relations took a dramatic turn on August 11, 1989, when Vermont District
Court Judge Joseph J. Wolchik dismissed charges of fishing without a state
license against Chief Homer St. Francis and other Abenaki "because [the
court] recognizes their claim to unextinguished aboriginal fishing rights."'
The State of Vermont appealed Judge Wolchik's decision to the Vermont
Supreme Court, and on June 12, 1992, the court reversed and remanded the
district court's decision.6 In a unanimous decision, the court concluded that
a series of historical events had extinguished Abenaki aboriginal rights:
"Extinguishment," the court held, "may be established by the increasing
weight of history."7
Polilical reaction to the decision was swift. Governor Howard Dean praised
the court for clearing up title insurance problems caused by insurance
companies that declined to provide title insurance for properties in northwest-
ern Vermont due to potential Abenaki land claims.' The Burlington Free
3. WILLIAM A. HAVILAND & MARJORY W. POWER, THE ORIGINAL VERMONTERS: NATIVE
INHABITANTS, PAST & PRESENT 38 (1981); see also COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE WESTERN
ABENAKIS OF VERMONT, 1600-1800 (1990); Christine A. Doremus, Note, Abenaki Indians of
Vermont, 10 VT. L. REV. 417, 420 (1985); Robert 0. Lucido 11, Note, Aboriginal Title: Abenaki
Indian Lind Claim in Vermont, 16 VT. L. REv. 611, 623-32 (1992).
4. Under the leadership of Chief Homer St. Francis, Vermont's native people began
confronting state authority. One tactic has been civil disobedience in the form of "fish-ins,"
fishing without state licenses; this has been used to assert hunting and fishing rights based on the
doctrine of aboriginal title. See CALLOWAY, supra note 3, 248-50; see also Richard
Cowperthwait, Abenakis Plead Innocent to Fishing Charges, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS
(Burlington, Vt.), April 23, 1979, at 7A, col. 4.
5. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at I (Vt., Franklin Dist. Ct. Aug. 11,
1989).
6. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993). Lawyers
for the Abenaki filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on November 18, 1992, presenting two
issues for the Court:
(1) Were the aboriginal fishing rights of the Missisquoi Abenaki Tribe extin-
guished merely by the 'increasing weight of history' in the absence of any lawful
means of extinguishment recognized by this Court?; [and] (2) Were Petitioners'
due process rights violated by the Vermont Supreme Court's reliance upon
secondary sources of information, not introduced at trial, to supply adjudicative
facts?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Elliot v. Vermont, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993) (No. 92-877).
7. Id. at 218. These events began in 1763 when New Hampshire Governor Benning
Wentworch made a series of land grants that formed the basis of Vermont and ended with
Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791.
8. Yvonne Daley, Court Ruling Against Abenakis Debated, SUNDAY RUTLAND HERALD &
SUNDAY TIMES ARGUS (Rutland, Vt.), June 21, 1992 at ID, 2D. For a practitioner's guide to
Indian land claims litigation, see Sharon J. Bell, Indian Title Problems: A Survival Primer, PROn.
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Press editorialized that the "Vermont Supreme Court's job was to determine
whether the Abenaki were robbed 200 years ago - and if so, to make sure
they stay[ed] robbed. They were, and the court did."9 Legal reactions were
likewise divided. 0
This note focuses on questions of extinguishment of Abenaki aboriginal
title, using historical and legal analysis. After reviewing the aboriginal claims
of the Abenaki and the basic rules for extinguishment, it asks whether the
Vermont Supreme Court misanalyzed the historical record. The note then asks
whether the court used this historical record to pay homage to clearly
established rules for extinguishing aboriginal title while establishing a new
and weaker extinguishment test that radically undermines the animating
purpose of the United States Supreme Court's test.
L Background: Aboriginal Claims of the Abenaki
A. Aboriginal Title Generally
In the 1823 case Johnson v. M'Intosh," Chief Justice John Marshall set
forth the theory of aboriginal title:
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn
& PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 30.
9. Editorial, Wronging a Right, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.), June 18, 1992,
at 1OA; see also William Haviland, Vermont Must Address Grievances, BURLINGTON FREE PRESs
(Burlington, Vt.), July 6, 1992, at 6A (Vermont Perspective guest editorial). An anthropologist,
University of Vermont professor, Abenaki expert, and author of The Original Vermonters,
Haviland criticized the decision for perpetuating a "continuing injustice" against Vermont's native
people. Id.; see also Letter from Board of Directors, Peace & Justice Coalition, Burlington, Vt.,
to Governor Howard Dean (July 22, 1992) (on file with the Peace & Justice Coalition,
Burlington, Vt.) (attacking the decision as being "not compelled by law but only by the hubris
of a government bent on breaking the will of the Abenaki people."). But see David Barra,
Abenaki 'Tribe" and Claims Fail Legal Tests, Vermont Perspective, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS
(Burlington, Vt.), July 6, 1992, at 7A. A Burlington lawyer who has represented various Franklin
County, Vermont municipalities in cases involving Abenakis, Barra called the decision a "fair
reading of the documents and the history of this area." Id.
10. Daley, supra note 8, at ID, 2D. Franklin County State's Attorney Howard
VanBenthuysen viewed the decision as one based on history and law rather than a political
maneuver. He applauded the.decision especially in light of the roughly 160 cases that had been
pending in his office since 1987. Id. at 2D. However, Indian law experts were quick to criticize
the decision as clearly political. "The thing that is most disturbing is that the court does not talk
about aboriginal fishing rights in its ruling, but turned this into an aboriginal land claim case.
... It's a clear indication that this was a political decision." Id. at 1D (quoting Ben Bridges, a
North Carolina attorney who represents the eastern band of Cherokee).
Bob Anderson, staff attorney with the Native American Rights Fund, characterized the
decision as a "typical state law massacre of Indian interests." Telephone Interview with Bob
Anderson, Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund (Jan. 19, I993).
11. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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chiefly from the forest .... However extravagant the pretension
of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest
may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance
and afterward sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the great mass of the community originates in it, it
becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned. So too
with respect to the principle that the Indian inhabitants are to be
considered merely as occupants to be protected while in peace in
the possession of their lands but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others.'2
This theory did not spring full-blown from the mind of Chief Justice
Marshall.'3 Instead of being unique to the United States, the theory has deep
roots in colonial outlooks of each European power that set foot in the New
World. 4 Aboriginal title is the Indians' nontreaty right to possess, use, and
occupy lands they have continuously occupied since time immemorial." In
order to successfully invoke the protection of aboriginal title, Indians must
prove actual, exclusive, and continuous use over an extended period of
time. 6 When land is held under aboriginal title "no one [can] purchase it or
12. Id. at 590-91 (Marshall, C.J.).
13. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43-47 (1947)
[hereinafter Cohen, Original Indian Title] ("In the main, [our concepts of Indian title] are to be
traced to Spanish origins, and particularly to doctrines developed by Francisco de Vitoria, the real
founder of modem international law."); see also FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 58-60 (1984) (explaining views of
Thomas Jefferson and Henry Knox, the nation's first Secretary of War); Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.,
John Marshall on History, Virtue, and Legality, in JOHN MARSHALL'S ACHIEVEMENT: LAW,
POLITICS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS 95, 99-100 (Thomas C. Shevory ed., 1989);
ROBERT K. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 52 (1968) (stating that
Marshall's principles "accorded perfectly with the peculiar blend of subdued 'realism' and
conspicuous humanity guiding Locke's discussion of conquest in Chapter XVI of the SECOND
TREATISE').
Marshall noted that his theory was not novel when he wrote, "This opinion conforms precisely
to the principle which has been supposed to be recognised by all European governments, from
the first settlement of America." M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592.
14. See FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 50-58, 486-87 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
15. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574; see COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 487.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941); COHEN'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 442, 492; see also Lucido, supra note 3, at 615-19; David G.
Kelly, Jr., Note, Indian Title: The Right of American Natives to Lands They Have Occupied Since
Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 655 (1975); Ralph Erikson, Note, Aboriginal Land Rights
in the United States and Canada, 60 N.D. L. REV. 107 (1984); Kimberly Ordon, Note, Aboriginal
Title: The Trials of Aboriginal Indian Title and Rights - An Overview of Recent Case Law, 13
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59 (1988).
An interesting collateral issue is whether the existence of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights
depends upon aboriginal title to land. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 442; Ordon,
supra, at 70-71, 76-77. Ordon has found that the existence of aboriginal rights separate from
450 [Vol. 18
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otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the sovereign" or
until the sovereign has "extinguished" the aboriginal title.'7 Extinguishment
is the .'exclusive right of the United States' ... whether it be done by treaty,
by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to
the right of occupancy, or otherwise . . .
B. Abenaki Claim of Aboriginal Title
Abenaki aboriginal claims are based upon archeological and historical
findings, as well as oral tradition, that show their continuous presence in the
Missisquoi River region of northwestern Vermont, the Swanton-Highgate area,
since 9300 B.C. 9 The Franklin District Court found that the Abenaki, "as a
result of their long use and occupancy of the Missi[s]quoi territory to the
exclusion of other tribes, held aboriginal title and aboriginal fishing rights in
the Missisquoi territory."" Judge Wolchik found this title to be unextin-
guished.2 ' However, in State v. Elliot," the Vermont Supreme Court held
otherwise, finding Abenaki aboriginal title extinguished by the "increasing
weight of history."'
II. Extinguishment
A. United States Supreme Court Test
Although extinguishment cannot exist in isolation from other questions of
aboriginal title, it is a crucial issue because once extinguished, aboriginal title
aboriginal title to land is a "question that awaits judicial resolution." Id. at 59; see also United
States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 470 U.S.
39, 44-45 (1984); Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, 655 F.2d 176, 180 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1981) (implying that while the court did not "necessarily" look favorably on the proposition,
the question was still open).
17. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation 470 U.S. 226, 234, 248 (1985) (Oneida II)
(holding that the sovereign is the United States government and the power to extinguish lies with
Congress).
18. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 347 (citing Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)).
19. Doremus, supra note 3, at 420-21; Lucido, supra note 3, at 629-32; see HAVILAND &
POWER, supra note 3; CALLOWAY, supra note 3; see also State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr,
slip op. at 5 (Vt., Franklin Dist. Ct. Aug II, 1989) ("[The Abenaki] have a very definite, carefully
maintained, carefully transmitted oral tradition, which is a useful source of information concerning
the location of their ancestral homelands.").
20. St. Francis, No. l171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 53-54.
21. Id., slip op. at 1, 92. "[The State has failed to prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that the Missisquoi [Abenaki] abandoned or ceded their Missisquoi homeland or that
their aboriginal rights were extinguished by either an express act or an act clearly and unambigu-
ously implying any sovereign's intent to extinguish those rights." Id., slip op. at 92.
22. 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993).
23. Id. at 218. The court did not rule on whether the Abenaki had satisfied the requirements
of tribal status, and actual, exclusive and continuous use over an extended period of time because
of their holding that any such claims were extinguished by 1791.
No. 2]
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is gone forever.' The framework for extinguishment was established by
Chief Justice Marshall, first in the 1823 case Johnson v. M'Intosh, and then
in 1831 and 1832 with two other seminal Indian title and rights decisions. 6
This "Marshall Trilogy" established a basic rule that Indians "have an
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,
until that right shall be extinguished" by the sovereign." Under this frame-
work, the sovereign holds a fee simple title created by the right of "discov-
ery."' However, the title is merely a "naked fee title"2 which gives the
holder "no present possessory interest in the land."3 This interest only allows
for an "ultimate reversion in fee,"'" because it is subject to an Indian
"perpetual right of occupancy. ' 32 Because "naked fee title merely constitutes
a reversionary interest, [it] becomes possessory only if Congress clearly and
plainly extinguishes the Indian title."33
This bedrock of Indian law was reaffirmed in this century in United States
v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad.' Santa Fe stands for several basic proposi-
24. See, e.g., United States v. Alcea Bands of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946)
("Termination of the right by the sovereign action was complete and left the land free and clear
of Indian claims.").
25. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
26. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; see also M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 585;
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544.
28. COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 489-90.
29. Id. at 489.
30. id.
31. Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 756 (1835).
32. Id. at 746.
33. The plenary power of Congress is derived from the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o Regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... ");
COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 489; see also Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note
13, at 52-54 (stating that although Congress granted railroads millions of acres of public lands,
grantees took lands encumbered with Indian title); Nell J. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign:
Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1225-26 (1980).
34. 314 U.S. 339 (1941). At issue was a claim by the Walapai (Hualpai) Indians, brought
by the federal government on their behalf, that the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad was interfering with
their right to possess and occupy certain lands in northwestern Arizona. Id. at 343-44. The
railroad claimed full title to these lands based on a grant to its predecessor, the Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad made by act of Congress- Id. (citing Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, § 2, 14 Stat.
292, 294). The Act, however, required a voluntary cession to "all lands falling under the
operation of this act." Id. (quoting Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. at 294).
The Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Douglas, found that an executive order in 1883
establishing a reservation had extinguished aboriginal title to lands off the reservation. Id. at 358.
The tribe had requested a reservation to protect lands that were "fast being populated" by whites.
Id. The Court also stated:
The reservation solution had long seemed desirable in view of recurring tension
between the settlers and the Walapais. In view of the long standing attempt to
[Vol. 18
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tions: (1) the supreme power of Congress, as sovereign, to extinguish
aboriginal title; (2) the validity of various means to extinguish Indian title:
treaties, force, purchase, the "exercise of complete dominion adverse to the
right of occupancy, or otherwise"; (3) the necessity for "plain and unambigu-
ous action to deprive the [Indians]" of aboriginal title; and (4) the judicial
construction that "extinguishment cannot be lightly imputed."
The continued validity of the Marshall Trilogy and the Santa Fe elabora-
tion is evidenced by a trilogy of cases regarding the claims of the Oneida
Indian Nation against the State of New York.' In Oneida County v. Oneida
Indian Nation (Oneida II),31 the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of discovery,
holding that discovering nations held "fee title to these lands, subject to the
Indians' right of occupancy and use."3 It noted that "with the adoption of the
Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal
law."39 The Court further noted that the right of use and occupancy "need not
be based on treaty, statute, or other formal Government action."' Finally, the
Court endorsed the key holding on extinguishment from Santa Fe: extinguish-
ment must be "plain and unambiguous and will not be lightly implied."4'
B. Animating Policies
The role that this special canon of construction plays - extinguishment
must be "plain and unambiguous" and will not be "lightly implied" - was
acknowledged by the Vermont court in Elliot.42 This canon stems from
settle the Walapais' problem by placing them on a reservation, their acceptance of
this reservation must be regarded in law as the equivalent of a release of any tribal
rights which they may have had in lands outside the reservation.
Id.
35. Id. at 344-55.
36. The Oneida trilogy concerned the legitimacy of various treaties between the Oneida
Nation and the State of New York which conveyed title to millions of acres of land between the
1780s and 1790s. In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida
1), the United States Supreme Court held that once the Constitution was adopted only Congress
could extinguish title to Indian lands. Id. at 667. In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation
470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida 11), the Court found that the conveyances violated the Constitution
and the Nonintercourse Act. Id. at 233. In Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145
(2d Cir. 1988) (Oneida III), the court held that during the Confederation period, states had the
right to extinguish Indian title within their borders. Id. at 1154.
37. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
38. Id. at 234.
39. Id. The Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of states in 1788, one year after
being adopted by the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. See also CRARLEs A. BEARD
& MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 120-37 (1944).
40. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 236.
41. Id. at 247-48. Implicit in Santa Fe and Oneida I1 is an understanding that while courts
review particular actions of Congress or the applicable sovereign, they will also look at "a series
of [sovereign] actions .. . [that] clearly demonstrate that the ... Indian title has been
extinguished." United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1976).
42. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 213 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1258 (1993)
No. 2]
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official United States Indian policy, including that of aboriginal title, which
has been motivated by a highly paternalistic attitude toward Indian nations. 3
The Marshall Trilogy reflected this attitude.' Marshall based his character-
ization of the "peculiar" status of Indians as both "a dependent" and "a distinct
people" on his understanding of British colonial policy before the Revolu-
tion.4 The Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the Trade and
(quoting Oneida 11, 470 U.S. at 248; United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346
(1941)). However, this acknowledgement seems perfunctory. The Vermont court found
extinguishment despite the lack of any express statement of intent to extinguish Abenaki title. It
also conceded that the "period preceding Vermont's statehood was a confusing era, and that valid
questions remain as to the legitimacy of the opposing governing entities." Elliot, 616 A.2d at 221.
43. In upholding employment preferences for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs against
an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court noted a "special relationship" between the
federal government and Indian tribes. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). The Court
described the relationship: "In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States
overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an
uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others
and their own improvidence." Id.
44. In Cherokee Nation, Marshall termed Indian nations "domestic dependent nations" and
asserted that they "look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power;
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father." Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
In Wcrcester, Marshall was protective of Indian rights although less paternalistic:
[r]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence - its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
Worcester recognized the sovereign powers that Indian nations still possessed in holding that
the laws of Georgia violated treaties with the Cherokee Nation. The treaties "mark out the
boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia; guaranty to [the Cherokee] all the
land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens
from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the [Cherokee] nation to govern
itself." Id. at 561-62. Interestingly, the law that Marshall nullified was used to indict a Vermonter,
Samuel A. Worcester. Worcester was a missionary who was translating the Bible into the
Cherokee language and was residing within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, "with the
permission and approval" of the Cherokee but without a state license. Jd. at 529.
45. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 596 (1823). In Worcester, Marshall cited
a 1763 speech by the superintendent of Indian affairs, Mr. Stuart for the "general views of Great
Britain" that the Crown's policy was "to treat Indians with justice and humanity, and to forbear
all encroachments on the territories allotted to them ...." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547.
Marshall also cited the Royal Proclamation of 1763 in Worcester. Id. at 548; see Royal
Proclamation of 1763 (Gr. Brit. Oct. 7, 1763), in 3 THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 2135-39 (Wilcomb E. Washburn comp., 1973); see also Robert N. Clinton, The
Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the
Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U. L. REV. 329 (1989). For more on the Indian policies and
practices of the Crown during the pre-Revolution period, see infra notes 109-39 and accompany-
ing text. Clinton notes that Marshall has offered "the most extended judicial discussion of the
historical importance of the Proclamation in American Indian law" in Worcester, a point Clinton
[Vol. 18
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Intercourse Acts also reflected the underlying premise that the federal
government was a guardian for its Indian "wards."' Treaties with Indian
tribes and Nations in the formative days of our republic also shed light on a
policy to protect Indian, land rights, although the purpose was to maintain
peace. 7 For example, the 1795 Treaty of Greenville with twelve Indian
nations for lands west of the Pennsylvania frontier stated:
feels does not speak well of the Nation's jurisprudence in this area. Id. at 367. The thrust of
Clinton's argument is that the Proclamation "embodied an enlightened colonial policy that sought
to facilitate both Native American trade and colonial expansion while recognizing Indian rights
in the land." Id. at 329. The failure of United States policy towards its native peoples, Clinton
asserts, is due in part to "the failure of federal and state governments to learn from the teachings
of this past." Id. at 330. In essence, therefore, the United States has followed formalistic
protection over Native American affairs while ignoring the central tenet that supposedly underlies
it, justice.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause); Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. Section 4 of the Act provided that
no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the
United States, shall be valid to any person ... or to any state... unless the same
shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority
of the United States.
Id.
The Constitution and the Nonintercourse Act were a return to the British colonial policy of
centralized control over Indian affairs and a departure from the Articles of Confederation period.
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 4 (U.S. 1781) (reserving the original 13 states
power to deal with Indians living within their borders).
Clinton notes that the Framers of the Constitution realized that the Confederation's reservation
of power to the states was not working. The states would not and could not stop the "avaricious
disposition in some of our people to acquire large tracts of land and often by unfair means,
[which] appears to be the principal source of difficulties with the Indians .... See Clinton,
supra note 45, at 371. See generally FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE Acrs 1790-1834, at 26-46 (1962)
[hereinafter PRUCHA, FORMATIVE YEARS].
The continual reassertion by Congress of its ideas of justice toward the Indians
began to have a hollow sound. Part of the problem undoubtedly came from the
haziness ... about the exact authority of Congress, and the intermeddling of the
states in Indian affairs aggravated the difficulties of the general government.
Id. at 38. Prucha quotes Secretary of War Henry Knox as telling Governor William Blount in
1792:
[I]t is the most ardent desire of the President of the United States, and the general
government, that a firm peace should be established with all the neighbouring
tribes of Indians on such pure principles of justice and moderation.... We may
therefore now [that the Constitution is in force] speak to them with the confidence
of men conscious of the fairest motives towards their happiness and interest in all
respects.... The reproach which our country has sustained will be obliterated and
the protection of the helpless, ignorant Indians, while they demean themselves
peaceably, will adorn the character of the United States.
Id. at 41; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 510-15.
47. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 62-74. "[Through the application of special
canons of construction, Indian treaties are construed in favor of the Indians ... the rules are
based upon the trust relationship with Indian tribes." Id. at 63.
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The Indian tribes who have a'right to those lands, are quietly to
enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as
they please, without any molestation from the United States; but
when those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their
lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United
States; and until such sale, the United States will protect all the
said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all
citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons
who intrude upon the same.48
Thus, the requirement for plain and unambiguous acts of extinguishment
stems from this underlying assumption of guardianship.49 The deconstruction
of a sovereign's actions towards Indians is essential because implicit
extinguishment must be judged in light of an "avowed solicitude of the
Federal government for the welfare of its Indian wards."' Furthermore,
"doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United States,
are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people [Indians], who
are wards of the nation and dependent wholly upon its protection and good
faith."'" It is upon this standard that Elliot must stand or fall.
C. Application of Rules of Extinguishment
Aboriginal title does not need to be codified in order to be valid. 2
However, federal courts have used a distinction drawn between aboriginal title
and "treaty-reserved title"53 to conclude that aboriginal title enjoys a
"different legal status than a treaty-recognized use .... [T]he difference is
significant in determining how explicit a subsequent Congressional enactment
must be in order to abrogate the Indians usufructuary rights."' For aboriginal
48. Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawas, Chipewas, Putawatimes,
Miamis, Eel-river, Weea's, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias, Aug. 3, 1795, art. V, 7 Stat.
49, 52.
49. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 354; Oneida Indian Nation v.
County of Oneida 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974) (Oneida 1) (stating that Indian land claim "rests on
the not insubstantial claim that federal law now protects, and has continuously protected from the
time of the formation of the United States, possessory rights to tribal lands").
50. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 354.
51. Id.
52. County of Oneida'v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida 11), 470 U.S. 226, 236 (1985).
53. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,277-78 (1955); accord United States
v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 n.29 (1980).
54. Laz Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 351 (7th Cir. 1983). The Supreme
Court has made clear that treaty-recognized rights require, if not explicit unilateral abrogation by
Congress, then "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended
action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by
abrogating the treaty." United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986); see also Robert
Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Federal Statutes Protective of the Environment,
31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859 (1991). But see Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial
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title, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have held that implicit
sovereign abrogation or extinguishment is sufficient.5 It is in the struggle
over what acts or combination of acts constitute implicit extinguishment in
which the policies underlying the Santa Fe test are themselves tested.5
When treaties have been voluntarily entered into between the federal
government and Indian nations courts have been willing to extinguish rights
not reserved by these treaties. However, the creation of a reservation and
the consensual settlement of Indians on it has only served to extinguish
aboriginal title in light of other supporting circumstances. Likewise,
preparation for or anticipation of white settlement on Indian lands do not
alone serve to extinguish aboriginal rights. 9 Preparation can be contrasted
with the actual settlement or entry by non-Indians accomplished through
lawful conveyances by the Congress or other congressional acts which have
been held to extinguish aboriginal title. Acquisition of a huge expanse of
Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth"
- How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975) (urging an express statement
requirement for abrogation, a rule rejected by Dion).
55. Lac Courte Oreilles pointed to Santa Fe as "[r]eflecting the ease with which Congress
may extinguish aboriginal title .... Lac Courte Oreilles, 700 F.2d at 352. However, United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977), relied on United States v.
Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976), for the proposition that "when the United States acts
in a manner which manifests an intention to extinguish, regardless of the means or propriety of
the action," extinguishment occurs. Atlantic Richfield, 435 F. Supp. at 1020 n.45 (citing Gemmill,
535 F.2d at 1148).
56. There is an inherent tension involved in remaining true to the policies inspiring the
"solicitude" towards Indian nations while responding to the "normal" everyday legal concerns of
the United States and its political subdivisions. Divining congressional motives based on
ambiguous acts, without Congress's having made an explicit consideration of the effect these acts
will have on aboriginal rights, is difficult enough without also having to look through the lens
of historical hindsight and current political expediency, as is the case in virtually all questions of
extinguishment. And in the case of the eastern tribes of Indians, where the issue is further
complicated by actions of the English sovereign before the Revolution and the States during the
pre-Constitution period, the task of deciding if extinguishment has occurred is especially difficult.
The Abenaki claims exist in the most problematic of all of these worlds since Vermont declared
itself an independent republic between 1777 and its 1791 admission as the 14th State. It was
created within the context of ajurisdictional dispute between New York and New Hampshire over
land grants and political-judicial control.
57. See Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1888); United States v. Santa Fe Pac.
R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 383 F.2d 991 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
58. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386 (Ct.
CI. 1974); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
59. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974); United States v. Pueblo of San
Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
60. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977); United
States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Gila River Pima-Maricopa
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land, i.e., Alaska, has been deemed not to automatically extinguish aboriginal
title without something more.6 However, land claims settlement acts, general
or express with regard to extinguishing Indian claims, have been given great
weight by the courts.' Forcible removal, military conquest, and confinement
to the reservation have been generally found to extinguish Indian title. 3
Inclusion of Indian lands in forest reserves, conservation, or recreation
districts have been insufficient by themselves but considered a significant
factor when looking at other acts of the sovereign.' Payments of Indian land
claims have increasingly been found to have extinguished aboriginal title to
those lands.' Finally, if complete dominion by the sovereign is exercised
over aboriginal lands in any manner or means, courts have found that Indian
title over this land is extinguished.'
III. Weight Of History Decision
A. Test Derived from Elliot
The Vermont Supreme Court ostensibly paid homage to these clearly
established rules for extinguishing Abenaki aboriginal title. Yet Elliot
misinterprets Abenaki/Vermont history during the period from 1763 to 1791.
An honest account of history would not have found extinguishment under the
traditional rules. Hence, to avoid this conclusion, the Vermont Court created
a radical new test that undermines the United States Supreme Court's rules
and purposes protecting aboriginal title.
The court created the "weight of history" test: "Extinguishment may be
established by the increasing weight of history."67 The "weight of history"
in turn means the "cumulative effect of many historical events."' Essentially,
the court changed the test from an examination of intent/purpose to a review
of cumulative effects. Under this new test, a sovereign need not have known
Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
61. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977); Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
62. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Alaska 1977); United
States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1976).
63. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941); United States v. Gemmill, 535
F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
64. See United States v. Genmnill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976); Tlingit & Haida Indians
of Alaska v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452 (D. Alaska 1959); United States v. Pueblo of San
Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Ct. 1975).
65. See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39 (1984); Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians
v. Bateman, 655 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992).
68. Id.
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that the consequences of an act would eliminate aboriginal title. Therefore,
if the sovereign unleashed forces which eventually frustrated Indian occupan-
cy, Elliot would find extinguishment in that act. Elliot implicitly holds that
the cumulative effects need not be manifested at the time of or near in time
to the sovereign action. The functional result of Elliot is that courts will
weigh the cumulative effects of a sovereign's action over a long time - say,
200 years. This removes the barrier prohibiting the light imputing of
extinguishment. Elliot undermines the entire framework of aboriginal title
law.
B. Elliot's Weak Legal Foundation
The Vermont Court's point of departure was the fact that federal courts
have found extinguishment on the basis of a combination of individually
insufficient acts of the sovereign. "The legal standard does not require that
extinguishment spring full blown from a single telling event."' In particular
the court looked to United States v. Gemmill," Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community v. United States,7 and United States v. Pueblo of San
Ildefonson for guidance.'
These three cases do not support the "weight of history" test for extinguish-
ment. For example, what is so strikingly different about Elliot and Gemmill
is that the three events relied upon in Gemmill were decisive acts by the
federal government which directly undermined aboriginal title: successful
military campaigns directed against the Pit River Indians, inclusion of Indian
69. Id.
70. 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. 494 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
72. 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
73. The Elliott court relied on Gemmill for three propositions: (1) that a historical event,
although insufficient itself, may contribute to a finding of extinguishment; (2) that a course of
conduct over a long period of time may prove extinguishment, although the actual date is difficult
to decide; and (3) congressional action may resolve ambiguities inherent in noncongressional
actions. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 213-14, 221 (citing Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1148-49).
Elliot also relied on Gila River for three propositions: (1) that authorized white settlement is
one factor in deciding when aboriginal title ceased; (2) that in an appropriate factual context the
opening up of an area for settlement can be tantamount to ending aboriginal title over the whole
region; and (3) that congressional actions which authorized and ratified previous events may
suffice as evidence of extinguishment. Id. at 219, 221 (citing Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1391-93).
Finally, Elliot relied upon San Ildefonso for three propositions: (1) extinguishment is to be
analyzed in light of the particular facts, circumstances and history of the case; (2) the inclusion
of Native American lands in a "forest reserve and grazing district, as well as conveyances made
to various grantees at different times is evidence supporting a finding of extinguishment;" and (3)
that "there are no fine spun or precise formulas for determining the end of aboriginal ownership."
Id. at 214, 219, 221 (citing San lldefonso, 513 F.2d at 1387, 1389-92).
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lands into a national forest reserve, and the payment of congressionally
authorized compensation 4 The Abenaki situation is not analogous."
In Gila River, neither creation of a reservation, formation of a land district,
surveying of Indian lands, nor actual settlement by non-Indians on a small
percentage of aboriginal title lands was sufficient alone or cumulatively to
extinguish Indian title.' Clearly, if a cumulative effects test were adopted as
the standard, the Gila River court would have had no problem establishing
extinguishment based on these events. 7
Ellio's use of San Ildefonso is odd because San Ildefonso stipulates that
extinguishment may not be implied without clear and unambiguous acts by
Congress. San Ildefonso rejected the government's proposed extinguishment
dates of 1858 and 1905 because of an "absolute dearth of evidence indicating
an express Congressional purpose to abolish Indian title over the whole of
[Indian] ancestral homelands and the lack of any clear and convincing
evidence from which to imply an intent to terminate the [Indians'] entire
aboriginal ownership.""8 The absence of such evidence is what makes Elliot
such a radical departure from previously established jurisprudence."9
C. The Weights of History
The historical record supports a judgment in favor of the Abenaki. To
avoid such a result, the Vermont Court misconstrued history and changed the
test. This enabled the court to appear as if it was paying homage to clearly
established jurisprudential rules. The Elliot court differed "with the trial court
principally in its application of the test for extinguishment . ". . . ' Elliot
relied upon four factors: (1) the land grants of New Hampshire's colonial
Governor Benning Wentworth during the early 1760s; ' (2) Britain's
sanctioning of European dominion over the area that is now the State of
Vermont during the period from 1763 to 1777; (3) the zeal with which
Vermont's political leaders and armed militiamen protected their land grants
from the 1760s up to admission to the Union in 1791; and (4) the decade-long
negotiations between Congress and Vermont culminating in Vermont's 1791
admission into the Union.' The following sections discuss the historical and
legal problems inherent in the court's reliance upon these factors and how the
court's application results in the establishment of a new and unsound test.
I
74. Gemmnill, 535 F.2d at 1148-49.
75. See infra notes 76-186 and accompanying text.
76. Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1388-92.
77. See infra notes 77-186 and accompanying text.
78. San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1386, 1387, 1390.
79. See infra notes 80-186 and accompanying text.
80. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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1. Wentworth Grants
Elliot holds that "[t]he first significant historical event relevant to
extinguishment of Abenald aboriginal title was the royal grant of lands to
European settlers in the area claimed by the Abenakis in this case."' Despite
Elliot's assertions, the Wentworth Grants did not imply an intent to extinguish
Abenaki aboriginal title, nor can they accurately be used as part of a series of
sovereign acts which plainly and unambiguously show an intent to extinguish
Abenaki title.
The court's cursory review of this historical record does a great injustice
to the Abenaki. Three problems are inherent with reliance upon the grants: (1)
their ultra vires nature; (2) the failure of grantees to satisfy their conditions;
and (3) the lack of impact by grantees upon Abenaki lands in the Missisquoi
region.
a) The Grants' Ultra Vires Nature
The court admitted that the grants were beyond the scope of Wentworth's
powers: "Governor Wentworth's grants of the lands at issue may not have
been authorized by the Crown ... ."' It chose, however, to rationalize this
problem away and in doing so changed the test from sovereign intent to
cumulative effects (regardless of whether those effects stemmed from ultra
vires actions of a non-sovereign or not): "but any ultra vires exercise of
power... does not detract from the vast political changes it inspired."'
The grants were ultra vires because the land was actually in New York
Province.' The grants were functionally revoked by the 1764 Privy Council
83. Id. at 215. "On August 17, 1763 Royal Governor Benning Wentworth of New
Hampshire made land grants in the areas now known as St. Albans, Highgate and Swanton." Id.
84. Id. at 218.
85. Id. The court recited these "vast political changes": (I) the emergence of an independent
Vermont; (2) a drastic realignment of jurisdictional boundaries; (3) Crown sanction of European
domination over the area. Id.
86. New York's colonial authorities immediately protested these grants to the Crown. Elliot
noted that New .York's claim was based upon a Crown grant of 1674. A 1764 Privy Council
Order confirmed New York's claims and set the border between New York and New Hampshire
as the eastern bank of the Connecticut River. Id. at 218. However, because Royal authorities did
not or could not resolve the jurisdictional conflict, disputes continued. In 1767, the Crown
ordered New York to stop making grants until higher authorities could resolve the matter. 12
STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAws OF VERMONT 1777-1780, at ix-x (Allen Soule ed., 1964)
(one of 17 volumes issued by the State of Vermont compiling laws, petitions, proceedings, and
public papers of state authorities). In 1767, Royal authorities also passed a Revenue Act, the
Customs Commissions Act, and the Tea Act; British attempts at enforcement sparked the
beginnings of a continental revolution. See, e.g., BEARD & BEARD, supra note 39, at 98-99.
Without the Crown's ability to devote the necessary resources to end the dispute, New York
attempted on its own to assert jurisdiction. This sparked a concurrent local revolution,
spearheaded by Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys, which resulted in the birth of an
independent entity, Vermont. See generally 1 RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF SAFETY AND
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Order reaffirming New York's border on the Connecticut River.8 7 By
undervaluing the fact that the grants were beyond Wentworth's authority,
Elliot ignores the sovereign's clear and unambiguous intent to restrict the
actions of a colonial governor.
History and sound and proper application of the law does not support
extinguishment based upon these ultra vires grants. To avoid this conclusion,
Elliot creates a "weight of history" which obligated the Crown to affirmatively
preserve aboriginal rights during this jurisdictional dispute.88 Yet as Oneida
II and other claims of eastern Indian tribes clearly indicate, just because a
sovereign did not stop wrongful encroachments upon Indian rights does not
mean the sovereign intended to allow them to occur.89 Elliot ignores the
Oneida trilogy' in holding that the sovereign must effectively exercise its
guardianship powers if it is to undo the cumulative effects of ultra vires
actions which infringe upon aboriginal title. Given the problem of unautho-
rized encroachment within the overall national policy to assert dominion over
the entine continent, if the court's rule of law were valid, no aboriginal title
would have existed in the original thirteen colonies, a point disproved by
Oneida and the other land claims of the eastern tribes of Indians." Were this
GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, To WHICH ARE PREFIXED THE RECORDS
OF THE GENERAL CONVENTIONS FROM JuLY 1775 TO DECEMBER 1777, at 4-19 (Montpelier, Vt.,
E.P. Walton, ed., Steam Press of J. & J.M. Poland 1873) [hereinafter I COUNCIL & GOVERNOR];
WILLIAM DOYLE, THE VERMONT POLITICAL TRADITION AND THOSE WHO HELPED MAKE IT 12-
60 (1984).
87. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 68-71 (Vt., Franklin Dist, Ct. Aug.
11, 1989).
88. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 218. The court stated:
While the Crown may have declared the grants invalid based on a lack of
jurisdictional authority in this particular governor, the sovereign's intent to allow
British appropriation of the area was not in question. Despite earlier royal
statements, the Crown's conduct sanctioned European appropriation. Indeed, the
Crown was given opportunities to prevent European settlement to preserve
aboriginal rights during disputes between New York and New Hampshire over the
Wentworth Grants. Instead, the Crown maintained the status quo, advancing the
interests of European settlement in contravention of its earlier policy statements
about preserving Indian occupation.
Id. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
89. In Oneida II, the federal government knew that the negotiations by New York to buy the
Oneidas lands were in violation of the Nonintercourse Act, yet when the state ignored federal
warnings and entered into an agreement with the Indians, the federal government did nothing.
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation 470 U.S. 226, 232 (1985) (Oneida 11). For 200 years this
ultra vires action stood, yet Oneida II stands for the proposition that silence does not equal
ratification. Id. at 246-48; see also Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that failure of the sovereign to exercise its trust responsibility did not allow a non-
sovereign to encroach or purchase Indian lands without sovereign approval).
90. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida ); County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida 11); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988) (Oneida III).
91. Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 667; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation 470 US.
462 (Vol. 18
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the case, few Indian claims would withstand the cumulative effects of the
continental expansion of the United States.
b) Failure to Fulfill the Grants Conditions
Another problem with relying on the grants is that while the Missisquoi
grants were ostensibly conditioned on settlement,' in fact they were nothing
more than a lucrative means of land speculation. While Elliot drew the
conclusion that these conditions evidenced an intent of Europeans to hold
dominion over these Indian lands,93 "it does not appear that any of the
original grantees ever settled in Swanton, or even visited the lands which were
so generously conceded to them."' In the Missisquoi region, "the Wentworth
proprietors had not occupied their property, of course, and the town's first
permanent white inhabitants were Dutch settlers who began to arrive around
1785 under the impression that their lands were located in Canada."'9 Instead
of fulfilling their conditions, the original grantees sold their rights to others,
who in turn did the same until Ira Allen appropriated nearly all the Swanton
grant land. According to Vermont historian Kevin Graffagnino:
In actual practice, Wentworth's charters were little more than
thinly-veiled exercises in wholesale land speculation. The
Governor made no attempt to include prospective settlers among
his proprietors, and few of the original grantees [in any of the
grants in Vermont] ever visited the lands to which they held title.
. .. With only a few exceptions, the Wentworth proprietors
226 (1985) (Oneida M1); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370
(1st Cir. 1975); Narragansett Tribe v. South R.I. Land Dev., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D. R.I. 1976);
Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. BENNING WENTWORTH, GRANT OF LANDS IN HIGHGATE AND SWANTON (1763),
reprinted in 26 NEW HAMPSHIRE GRANTS, CHARTERS OF TOWNSHIPS [vol. 3] 220-23, 485-89
(Albert S. Batchellor ed., Concord, Vt., State of Vermont 1895) [hereinafter 26 Ntw HAMPSHIRE
GRANTS]. The governor required that the conditions be satisfied within five years or the lands
would revert to the Crown. Id. at 221, 486.
93. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 215. "Continued ownership was conditional: without actual settlement
and cultivation of the lands, title would revert to the British Crown." Id.
94. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 992.
95. KEVIN J. GRAFFAGNINO, THE SHAPING OF VERMONT 77 (1983).
96. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 992. Ira Allen was Vermont's first Surveyor General
and it is often noted that his work was disorganized and self-serving.
The Ira Allen private survey-bills are usually of less value, being mostly made for the
benefit of himself or his Onion River Company.... Hence, the greater part of the lotting
done by Allen or under his direction, dating from 1772 down to the close of the
Revolution, though historically helpful as affording the basis from which relotting was
made ... has slight value as record.
I STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: INDEX TO THE PAPERS OF THE SURVEYORS-GENERAL 6-7 (Franklin H.
Dewart comp. 1918).
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consisted of speculators, New Hampshire politicians and members
of the Governor's administration and family.'
Therefore, by misstating the conditional nature of the grants as an intent
to assert dominion, the Vermont court characterized the British's inability to
actualize revocation as an intentional acquiescence. However, as was the case
with the ultra vires nature of the grants themselves, silence will not demon-
strate an intent to acquiesce in extinguishment sufficient to satisfy the canon
against lightly imputing extinguishment." If anything, the fact that the grant
conditions were not fulfilled supports a finding that the Crown saw no need
to intervene in the Missisquoi because no encroachment actually occurred.
The Crown did have other concerns, after all, like the impending American
Revolution. As such, the holding in Elliot takes a radical step away from the
"strong policy of the United States' from the beginning to respect the Indian
right of occupancy . . .'"
c) Actual Settlement Did Not Negate Abenaki Occupation
Elliot asserted that "[w]hile the Crown may have declared the grants
invalid based on a lack of jurisdictional authority in this particular governor,
the sovereign's intent to allow British appropriation of the area was not in
question."'" The court erred, however, because sovereign authorities did not
engage in actions which were inconsistent with Abenaki dominion.
Grantees never came to the area, and settlement was sparse until after
Vermont's admission to the Union. Therefore, at best, the grants only
provided grantees with "naked fee" subject to the continuing Abenaki
occupation." Furthermore, this formulation of "British appropriation of the
area" misstates the nature of aboriginal title: the sovereign through the
"discovery" doctrine already had "appropriated" the area subject to Indian
occupancy."
97. GRAFFAGNINO, supra note 90, at 4. In 1805 state surveyor John Johnson ran a survey
of the town of Highgate. He found that:
Highgate was certainly one of the prime examples of the "Errors and confusions
produced by mad Speculators" [spawned by Wentworth's grants].... Ira Allen
and the Onion River Land Company had purchased many of the original New
Hampshire rights in the 1770's and Ira maintained the family interest during a
dizzying succession of state-ordered tax sales in the 1790's. In addition, the
lawsuits that Hathaway and others brought against Allen included claims for his
Highgate lands, and by the time of [John] Johnson's [state] survey in 1805, the
town's property records were hopelessly muddled.
Id. at 77.
98. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
99. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248 (1985) (Oneida I).
100. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992).
101. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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What Elliot failed to demonstrate was any action by the British which
showed an intent to take away Indian lands and give them to settlers. As
noted, there was a long period between the Wentworth Grants and the
establishment of any permanent European settlement in Missisquoi. The
Abenaki continued t6 dominate the area. 3 The first permanent white settler,
John Hilliker, leased his 100 acres in 1786 from the Abenaki, not from any
grantee." 4 Swanton, according to the 1790 census (taken in 1791), had
seventy-four non-Indian residents,"° while local white historians put the
number of Abenaki at about seventy in 1793."l The Wentworth Grants,
therefore, had "little perhaps no practical effect" on settlement and land tenure
in the Missisquoi region prior to Vermont's admission into the Union in
103. For example, a large settlement of 400-500 Abenaki resided quite openly at the
Missisquoi village in 1775. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 206. After the first settler, John Hilliker,
moved to the area in the mid-1780s, there were
no additional families [that] came here to live. During all this time he had no
neighbors in what are now the adjoining townships of Franklin County .... At the
period of his settlement, the Jesuit chapel and the Indian village were still in
existence. The bell used to be rung daily.
Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 972.
104. RODNEY R. LEDOUX, THE HISTORY OF SWANTON, VERMONT 2 (1988). Previous non-
Indian settlers were associated with a sawmill on the banks of the Missisquoi, first operated by
French and then leased to a Quebec merchant, James Robertson, in 1765 by the Abenakis. The
Abenaki lease lands were quite extensive, 1.5 miles by 4 miles. It did not however encompass
all the "Old Indian Castle" lands and it reserved certain lands within the lease for the Abenakis.
The lease was recorded in an office of registry in Quebec province. It is likely that Robertson
leased other lands of the extensive Abenaki territory in the Missisquoi River and Bay region near
the Canadian border. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 962-64; Calloway, supra note 3, at 194.
In the war of competing land grants between Wentworth and New York, colonial authorities
in New York granted Simon Metcalfe a grant of 33,000 acres in the region to establish
Prattsburgh in 1767. He established a sawmill at the site of the abandoned Robertson-French mill,
and a home and traded with the Indians. Local historians surmised that he worked closely with
Robertson and might have been in his employ. He was also a New York provincial surveyor.
Metcalfe's sawmill employed about 50 workmen, so that around the mill a sizeable community
existed. This community dispersed after the mill was burnt around the beginning of the
Revolution. Metcalfe lived amongst the Abenakis and relied on their trade in furs. Barney &
Perry, supra note 1, at 965-71; LEDoux, supra, at 14-16.
105. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'r OF COMMERCE & LABOR, HEADS OF FAMILIES
AT THE FIRST CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1790, VERMONT at 27
(1907).
106. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 1001. Town settlement was concentrated in five basic
areas, leaving much of the town unsettled by whites. Id. at 996-97. The town's first "Town
Meeting" occurred in 1790 in the home of a man living in the Abenaki lease section of Swanton
and Highgate. Id. In fact, most of the early settlers were Dutch and most had been loyalists
during the Revolution who went north thinking they were in Canada. Id. at 993-1001. Whatever
settlement that occurred in the Missisquoi region "largely ignored the political" boundaries. The
region, lake-bay-river, was treated as a unit by its inhabitants. Brian Young, Conflict and
Consensus: Lake Champlain from the Canadian Perspective, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN: REFLECTIONS
ON OUR PAST 143, 144 (Jennie G. Versteeg ed., 1987).
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1791."° Furthermore, significant amounts of land were ungranted. In 1796,
for example, Silas Hathaway petitioned the General Assembly for land in
Swanton and Highgate because after a survey by the Surveyor-General there
existed a vast amount of ungranted lands."~
Elliot used the Wentworth Grants for two misguided purposes: to hint at
a sovereign intent to divest the Abenaki of their Missisquoi homelands and,
acknowledging the problems inherent in that exercise, to establish the baseline
for its cumulative effects test. Unable to point to a sovereign action
manifesting an intent to extinguish, Elliot substituted silence and inaction for
the requisite plain and unambiguous act. It transformed a requirement to
demonstrate an intent to extinguish into a requirement to demonstrate an intent
to stop unauthorized actions from dispossessing Indians. The grants were ultra
vires and revoked by the Crown, the grantees never fulfilled their obligations,
and the Abenaki continued to hold dominion over the area up through
Admission. To these facts, Elliot answers with the cry of "vast political
changes [the grants] inspired." This is not a mere misapplication. Elliot turns
two centuries of Indian law and its guiding principle on its head in creating
its new rule.
2. British Policy Towards the Abenaki and the Region
Elliot might have successfully applied the extinguishment test if it had
noted any British policy clearly implying that the Crown desired to end
aboriginal title in the Missisquoi. If the court could have pointed to a lear
effect of The Wentworth Grants that undermined Abenaki title, it might have
successfully invoked the traditional test by pointing to a British action that
ratified that effect. This could have been a proper application of Gila River
and San Ildefonso.'"
107. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 962.
108. According to Hathaway:
[A] Quantity of land in Each of said Towns Considered by him as wast lands &
lands Covered with water by means of which the Surveyor Genaral'Included in the
Survey of sd. Towns a grater Quantity of land than was Given or Granted them
by tf are Respective Charters - which lands so Included as aforesaid Remains the
lands & property of this State ....
5 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT- PETITIONS FOR GRANTS OF LAND 1778-1811, at 431 (Mary G.
Nye ed., 1939) (quoting Petition of Silas Hathaway for All Ungranted Land Between Lake
Champlain, Sheldon and Fairfield (Oct. 18, 1796)). That the grants for Swanton and Highgate
were made without the benefit of surveys is easily determined by their square shapes when seen
in comparison to the actual topography. 26 NEw HAMPSHIRE GRANTS, supra note 92, at 220.-23,
485-88. For example, the maps accompanying the grants do not show either Missisquoi or
Maquam Bays, significant features of the topography. Id. at 223, 488. Furthermore, the grants
were for no more than twelve square miles combined, yet Swanton is twenty miles at its greatest
length. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 989, 991.
109. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 494 F.2d 1386, 1394
(Ct. Cl. 1974); United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1974). In
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Elliot pointed to neither Crown policies nor acts which might have allowed
it to properly infer extinguishment. Instead, it ignores express Crown policy
and intent to protect Indian rights, including those of the Abenaki."0 Elliot
changed the standard by which to judge acts of the sovereign by finding
support for extinguishment in the failure of the English authorities to
affirmatively, actively, and constantly protect Abenaki land rights.' Worst
of all, Elliot ignored express actions of Crown officials that were supportive
of Abenaki aboriginal rights."' Neither did the Vermont court point to
specific changes that so undermined Abenaki occupancy of the Missisquoi
region as to negate this essential element of aboriginal title."' The historical
record supports the Abenaki, not extinguishment; the court evaded this
conclusion by creating a new test in which extinguishment was lightly
imputed, in contravention of fundamental Indian policy.
a) Crown Indian Policy
Crown policy towards Indians in general, including the Abenakis, was
established by the 1761 Royal Instruction, the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
and the terms of peace that resulted from the British victory in the French and
Indian War."4 Elliot found the 1761 Royal Instruction and, the Royal
Gila River, the court pointed to the continuing interest by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in
protecting Indian lands from encroachment in relationship to the protective role that the
reservation, created in 1859, played in stopping such encroachments. Gila River, 494 F.2d at
1390. The Commissioner looked with alarm at the explosion of white settlement on off-
reservation lands between 1870 and 1880 and recommended to Congress and the President the
expansion of the reservation to preserve and protect Indian agricultural lands. Id. Therefore it "is
not far afield to infer that the Government was very aware of the extent and [negative]
potentiality of settlement at that period" and the court found that expansion of the reservation to
96% of its final size in 1883 was a reasonable date to set extinguishment. Id. at 1393.
San Ildefonso, in noting the piecemeal fashion of white settlement, rejected the "vast political
changes" approach of Elliot. It found extinguishment only when these changes were endorsed by
settlement made actually pursuant to public land law conveyances, when Indian lands were
included by the federal government in the Jemez Forest Reserve, or when the land was placed
within federal New Mexico Grazing District No. 1. San ldefonso, 513 F.2d at 1391-92. Hence
to properly analogize the Abenaki situation to these cases, the Vermont court would have had to
have shown that the British confronted any changes the grants had spawned and then decided to
ratify the changes in a manner adverse to Abenaki possession.
110. See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
114. See 1761 Royal Instruction (Gr. Brit. Dec. 2, 1761), in 5 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE
COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 478-79 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed., Albany, Weed,
Parsons & Co. 1856), cited in Clinton, supra note 45, at 354; see also State v. St. Francis, No.
1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 21-23 (Vt., Franklin Dist. Ct. Aug. 11, 1989); Royal Proclamation of
1763, supra note 45, cited in St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 23-25; Articles of
Capitulation, Sept. 8, 1760, Eng.-Fr., art. XL, cited in St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op.
at 20-21; Treaty of Paris, Feb. 10, 1763, Eng.-Fr., cited in St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip
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Proclamation of 1'763 to be "paper tigers" because the grantees were not
dispossessed of the land or removed at the Crown's direction; this indicated
an "increasing European dominion adverse to the use and occupation of the
Indians, to which the Crown impliedly consented.""
5
The Vermont court misjudged the nature of British Indian policy. It did not
acknowledge that British policy was evolutionary; for decades the Crown
relied upon colonial authorities to manage Indian relations while reserving for
the Crown the right of oversight."6 The flritish did not fully centralize
op. at 20-21.
Becausa the Abenaki fought for the French during the French and Indian War and article XL
of the Articles of Capitulation of 1760 provided for the "honorable, good, and fair treatment of
the French native American allies," the British had an obligation to protect Abenaki interests. St.
Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 20. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 formalized this
obligation. Id. at 20-21. British Indian policy was codified in both the 1761 Instruction and
Proclamation of 1763. Clinton, supra note 45, at 354.
The Proclamation "embodied an enlightened colonial policy that sought to facilitate both
Native American trade and colonial expansion while recognizing Indian rights in the land."
Clinton, supra note 45, at 329. The policy evolved slowly, beginning in the 1720s with the
growing role of the London Board of Trade in regulating Indian affairs and the subsequent
diminution of the role of colonial governors. By 1739, instead of leaving all decisions regarding
Indian affairs to colonial governors, "the British government had begun to coordinate and direct
colonial Indian policy with increasing frequency and force." Id. at 342.
In 1754, the Albany Conference was convened to discuss Indian affairs (the seven northern
colonies, including New Hampshire were all represented); initiated by the Board of Trade in order
to make uniform policy towards the Indians, the conference plan recommended that only colonial
governments be permitted to purchase Indian lands and such purchases would only occur at
public councils with the Indians. The plan was never implemented. Id. at'345-49.
The French and Indian War of 1756 disrupted, yet accelerated, the centralizing process. In
1761 the Crown "divested local colonial authorities of control over Indian land cessions" in a
Royal Instruction. Id. at 354. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (barely two months after the
Swanton-Highgate Grants) reaffirmed and implemented Crown Indian policy.
Special licenses were required for settlements on Indian lands and the Crown forbade granting
title to Indian lands not "ceded to or purchased" by the Crown. Id. at 356. Such cessions had to
have occuned at open meetings convened for that purpose. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip
op. at 23-25. The Proclamation established a boundary line that ran up the spine of the
Appalachian Mountains, of which the Green Mountains are a part. Land to the west of the line
was reserved for the Native Americans. The Missisquoi lands of the Abenaki were located within
this Indian country. Id. The Proclamation and the 1764 implementation plan marked the "apex
of British efforts to centralize control of Indian affairs." Clinton, supra note 45, at 360.
115. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 219 (Vt. 1992). The court asserted that after 1763 the
Crown did not retract any authority to make grants in this area in order to protect the Missisquoi
Abenakis, but only acted to resolve the jurisdictional dispute between New York and New
Hampshire. Id.
116. Clinton, supra note 45, at 334; see also Robert N. Clinton & Margaret T. Hotopp,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the
Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REv. 17, 19-23 (1979).
Having conveyed property rights in North America to the colonists by various
charters and patents, the crown was initially satisfied to let the colonists purchase
and extinguish Indian title, either individually or through the colonies. Since
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Indian policy until the early 1760s. "7 Therefore, the Elliot court had
unrealistic and inequitable expectations about the British capacity to effectively
implement a new, ambitious policy. Indeed, the problem in implementing
British Indian policy is analogous to a problem facing many modem American
political jurisdictions: strong laws have been written in response to serious
deficiencies in the common law or existing statutes, but implementation is
hampered by serious problems, including insufficient funding, poor enforce-
ment mechanisms, and inconsistent administration based on the vagaries of
politics."' Yet the inability to implement laws does not support an argument
that the laws have lost their binding effect.
Thus, Elliot is wrong to equate poor implementation of the Proclamation
with implicit intent to extinguish Abenaki title or seriously undermine it. The
Vermont court did not analyze why the Crown failed to enforce the Proclama-
tion more vigorously, imputing reasons not supported by the historical record.
In fact, implementation of the new, centralized approach was extremely
difficult and costly. For example, it took four years for the British Indian
Superintendents to achieve the first implementing task: to set a more
meticulous Indian boundary line as called for in the Proclamation.' Also, a
western frontier war, Pontiac's Rebellion, had to be fought during the inception
individual land transactions frequently created military frictions with the Indians,
the British colonies soon filled the regulatory void....
Thus, by 1755 the British government had recognized that the colonies were
unable to keep peace with the Indians in the absence of a comprehensive and
uniform imperial Indian policy.
Id. at 20, 22.
117. Clinton, supra note 45, at 354-55. Prior to centralization, conflicts arose due to the
competing needs of colonialists and Native Americans while competition with France and Spain
over the loyalty of Indian nations also increased. The Crown responded by centralizing its Indian
policy, manifesting its goals through the use of instructions and proclamations, but not the
resources necessary to effectively enforce them. Id. at 331-54; see also Clinton & Hotopp, supra
note 116, at 22 ("[E]ven more stringent measures were required to stem the tide of white settlers
encroaching on Indian land."). And:
Although [the Proclamation of 1763] was a new departure, there was a background
from which it grew. Wise men who were acquainted with the evils existing in
Indian affairs in the colonies and who realized more and more that the great cause
of Indian troubles was the steady encroachment of the whites upon the land of the
Indians had been advocating that a clear line of demarcation be drawn between the
areas of the two races.
PRUCHA, FORMATIVE YEARS, supra note 46, at 14.
118. As a City Councilor in Burlington, Vermont, from 1986 to 1992, the author can attest
to the inability of government to effectively fund the enforcement of all the laws on its books;
this is true for zoning, traffic control, drug enforcement, or pollution control. One example is in
minimum housing code enforcement, where inspections are mandated to be conducted every three
years, yet funds are insufficient to staff the necessary personnel.
119. Clinton, supra note 45, at 358.
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of the policy. 2 ' Finally, a 1764 proclamation implementation plan was
shelved in 1768, primarily due to the cost.'
In 1768, the Crown returned implementation of its new policy to colonial
authorities because it was "hoping that [they] would learn from [their] previous
mismanagement . . . .'"' Unfortunately, colonial authorities did not imple-
ment the policy, resulting in abuses and land encroachments which caused
widespread Indian unrest up to the eve of the Revolution.'" By the mid-
1770s, the British were poised for a reassertion of centralized control, only to
be forestalled by the American Revolution." Benning Wentworth, the New
Hampshire Grants, and subsequent New York Grants in the Missisquoi region
were not exceptions to this historical record."
120. IM. at 354; see PRUCHA, FORMATIVE YEARS, supra note 46, at 17. Pontiac's Rebellion
gave an "emergency stamp" to English policy because of its serious blockade of Detroit, the
defeat of many British rescue missions, and the "universal pannic throughout the Frontiers" that
it inspired. Id. at 17.
121. The policy always faced colonial opposition. Therefore, "the very success of prior
British efforts to centralize control over Indian affairs rendered less ominous the Indian and
French threats" so that the "heavy estimated cost to the Crown of twenty thousand pounds a year"
did not seem justified. Clinton, supra note 45, at 360-61.
122. 1& at 361. In light of the cost, it is also not unreasonable to believe that the British
hoped that colonial implementation of the Proclamation would appease the colonists who bristled
at the restrictions and the fact that "British officials were henceforward to dispose of large
sections of the Western territory and settle the question as to who was to reap the profits of the
various operations there, including the fur business." BEARD & BEARD, supra note 39, at 94.
123. British officials lamented colonial failure to implement the Proclamation. According
to the Earl of Hillsborough: "I am persuaded that could it have been foreseen, that the Colonies
would have been so backward and negligent in meeting those gracious intentions of the King,
which induced his Majesty to leave the. .. [implementation] to them, their Representation on the
subject would have not so far prevailed .... Clinton, supra note 45, at 362.
Even such a notable American such as George Washington did not take the implementation
of the policy as well as the policy itself seriously. "I can never look upon that proclamation in
any other light (but this I say between ourselves), than as a temporary expedient to quiet the
minds of the Indians, and must fall, of course, in a few years." Clinton & Hotopp, supra note
115, at 22-23 (citing VIRGIL J. VOGEL, THIS COUNTRY WAS OURS 57 (1972) (quoting in turn 2
THE WRMNGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 218-24 (Worthington C. Ford ed., New York, London,
G.B. Putnam & Sons 1889))).
124. Clinton, supra note 45, at 362 ("Immediately prior to 1776, the stage was set for
reassertion of complete imperial control over the management of Indian matters. The Revolution,
however, tlu'ew colonial hierarchies into complete disarray .... "); see PRUCHA, FORMAnvE
YEARS, supra note 46, at 24-25. In 1775, the British government sent Governor Carleton of
Quebec the Plan of 1764 to serve as a guide for a return to centralized control.
125. New Hampshire was represented at the 1754 Albany Conference. Clinton, supra note
45, at 346. New Hampshire was also sent the 1761 Royal Instruction and the Proclamation of
1763 was directed to all colonial governors. State v. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at
21-25 (Vt., Franklin Dist. Ct. Aug. 11, 1989). If Wentworth had willfully ignored official Crown
policy when he began making grants, any such action would have been an ultra vires act; such
acts would have been functionally prohibited by the 1761 Instruction and then revoked by the
Proclamation of 1763, issued some two months after the Wentworth Grants in the Missisquoi.
Id. at 64-71.
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b) A Requirement for Affirmative Action?
The Elliot court found that Royal efforts to end the dispute between New
York and New Hampshire "manifest an intention to pacify the two British
jurisdictions, not protect Native Americans."'2 This evidences another
attempt to establish a requirement that the sovereign must exercise its
guardianship powers or Native Americans will lose whatever protective shield
guardianship offers. Elliot concludes that "[t]he necessary and inevitable
outcome of the Crown's position would still be that Europeans would
appropriate the area, especially since the settlement of the lands was a British
goal during this time.'"27 Yet the same "necessary and inevitable outcome"
that resulted from the general opening up of western United States lands to
white settlement was found by Gila River to be insufficient to satisfy the
canon against light extinguishment." This was the same outcome that
inevitably resulted from vesting powers over Indian affairs in the states
through the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution and the Noninter-
course Acts removed those powers and centralized them, but it did so without
adequate implementation mechanisms. The argument that inaction equalled
ratification and implicit consent was expressly rejected by Oneida I., 29
c) British Settlement Policy in the Missisquoi
Although it was a fundamental premise in Elliot that European settlement
adverse to Abenaki possession resulted from the grants, clearly the Wentworth
Given the distance, the wildness of the country, and his basic desire to spawn a speculative
buying spree of land title, not land use or occupancy, there is no evidence Wentworth even knew
of the Abenaki occupation of the Missisquoi. Also, the grants covered only a small part of the
region. There was no intention to enforce the conditions of the grant. Early settlers were not
grant holders. The closest government to the area, Montreal, enforced the protective aspect of the
Crown's policy in 1765 when it refused to grant title to English settlers because it would conflict
with Abenaki lands. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
126. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 230 (Vt. 1992) ("[Ihe Crown did not retract any
authority to make grants in order to protect the aboriginal occupants in this area, but instead
merely attempted, as the trial court stated, to end the two provinces dispute over who had
jurisdiction.").
127. Id. (citation omitted).
128. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
129. See also Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 116, at 34-35.
[T]he Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Acts were intended to vest
control of Indian affairs in the federal government and to end the abuses caused
by lack of uniform policies among the states .... The lines drawn delineating
Indian Country were intended to regulate western expansion by defining the
territory within which whites could not freely move. The United States fully
contemplated that the Indian tribes would continue to cede lands east of the line
but that these cessions would conform fully to the requirements of the statutory
restraint against alienation. In this respect the Trade and Intercourse Acts were
similar in approach to the Proclamation of 1763 ....
Id. (emphasis added). See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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Grants did not result in grantees coming into possession of Abenaki lands.
The discrepancy between the lands granted and the lands aboriginally
occupied was significant. Actual settlement practice left the Abenaki in
control of their historic homelands. t '
Elliot grudgingly acknowledges the Crown's intent to protect aboriginal title
when it refers to the policy as a "paper tiger." Yet the court ignored key acts
of English support for the Abenaki that resulted from these obligations and
policies. For example, the English acknowledged the Abenaki's Missisquoi
possessions and encouraged them to lease these lands in the mid-1760s."'1
In 1765 the Governor of Lower Canada refused to grant title of 2000 acres
on the Missisquoi because it was found to be Abenaki land.' In the same
year, Robertson's ninety-one-year lease of timberland from the Abenaki -
some 4.5 miles long by 1.5 miles wide - was registered with colonial
authorities in Quebec province.' At a meeting on Isle La Motte in 1766,
the Governor of Quebec responded to Abenaki complaints that their lands
were being encroached upon by saying: "I will enquire into the particulars of
your request, in the mean while you may rest assured of Justice and Protection
"'134
In addition to other factors, geography also played a role in the reaction of
the British to the interests of the Abenaki in the Missisquoi. Authorities in
Canada, French and English, historically exercised jurisdiction over the
Missisquoi region. 35 A survey (circa 1770) placed most Missisquoi lands
130. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
131. Gordon Day, Abenakis in the Champlain Valley, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN: REFLECIIONS
ON OUR PAST 277, 286 (Jennie G. Versteeg ed., 1987).
132. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 194.
133. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 962; CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 194.
134. Speech by A. Belt and Strings of the Missisquoi Indians to the Governor of Quebec
(Sept. 8, 1766) (transcript on file with Public Archives of Canada, Archives Branch, Ottawa, Can.
(MG 11, Q 3, at 328-30)), noted in Gordon Day Deposition, Defendants' Exhibit 3, State v. St.
Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 1 (Vt., Franklin Dist. Ct. Aug. 11, 1989).
The September 1766 meeting took place near Missisquoi on Isle La Motte between the
governor (if Quebec, Governor Murray, and New York's governor, Governor Moore. St. Francis,
No. l171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 72-76. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the border
between New York and Quebec. The Isle La Motte meeting confirmed the border at the 45th
parallel north latitude but did not resolve any Indian issues. Id.
Abenaki representative attended, as did Caughnawaga Mohawks and Daniel Claus, a deputy
in the Crown Indian Affairs office. Id. at 73. During the meeting, the Abenaki asserted their right
to their ancestral Missisquoi lands. They complained in the particular of the New York grant to
Simon Metcalfe, who was claiming a significant portion of Abenaki land in Missisquoi, including
their "Village and Plantations." CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 195. The Caughnawagas also
asserted claims to these lands, and proceeded to cede these land claims to the English, retaining
only hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 194-95. The Abenakis never ceded or sold any rights at
this meeting. The governor of Quebec's response that the Abenaki could expect "Justice and
Protection" was a clear indication that the British respected Abenaki claims to the Missisquoi.
Gordon Day Deposition, Defendants' Exhibit at 3, St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 1.
135. Young, supra note 106, at 143-47; Day, supra note 131, at 286; see also St. Francis,
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in New York, not Quebec. This removed the protective shield of those
authorities who knew the Abenaki the best. It caused confusion amongst the
Abenakis who "had looked [to Canada] for so long for trade and assistance"
and who, along with their few white neighbors, treated both sides of the 45th
parallel as one area governed from Canada."z Opportunities for oversight
by British authorities were thereby lessened,'37 and the possibility of
illegal,' although colonially sanctioned, encroachment upon Abenaki lands
in the Missisquoi was consequently increased.'39
No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 19-21, 25-28.
136. Day, supra note 131, at 286. In 1783 the Treaty of Paris ended the American
Revolution, and the 45th parallel, since 1765 the boundary between Quebec and New York,
became the international boundary. Id.; see, e.g., LEDOUX, supra note 104, at 1.
137. In 1773, the Abenaki sent a delegation to Claus in order to reconfirm their complaint
that Metcalfe was encroaching upon Abenaki lands in Missisquoi. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at
196. At that meeting, Claus informed the Abenakis that the English considered that the
Caughnawaga cession at Isle La Motte had bound the Abenakis also. "Mhe Indians should have
free hunting & fishing in Lake Champlain but... Ground belongd. to the king & his Subjects
to wch. the Caughnaws. in behalf of the rest agreed." Id.
Extinguishment should not be implied from these events. British policy required voluntary
cessions of Indian lands, yet as St. Francis noted, the Caughnawagas had no right to cede the
Missisquoi lands. St. Francis, No. 1 171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 74. Also, Claus' acceptance of the
ultra vires Caughnawaga cession did not ratify it. "[T]hat a deputy of the Indian Affairs Office
considered the event to operate as a cession is not an act clearly and unambiguously implying the
sovereign's intent to extinguish the Missisquoi's aboriginal rights ...." Id. at 75. Furthermore,
the Abenakis still possessed the lands of the Missisquoi basin. Vast expanses of land remained
ungranted. Metcalfe's was the only significant white presence on their land, but he did not occupy
all of it, and much of his business depended on the Abenaki fur trade. See supra notes 103-08
and accompanying text.
138. See St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 76-78. The Metcalfe and subsequent
Prattsburgh grants, roughly covering the Wentworth grants and claiming the historic Abenaki
village and best farmland, did not extinguish aboriginal title for several reasons.
These grants violated Proclamation of 1763 policy by taking advantage of the Crown decision
to vest colonial authorities with the power to implement the Proclamation. Because the policy
limited acquisition of Indian lands to voluntary agreement made at an open, public meeting,
attended by the Indians and colonial governor and no such meeting occurred, the grants were in
contravention of British policy. When confronted with a similar request two years earlier, British
officials in Quebec refused to make the grants. New York's grants were exactly the sort of action
that would lead the British to seek recentralization in the 1770s. Also, the grants were still subject
to a right of occupancy, which the Abenaki exercised. Id.
139. The New York grants in the Missisquoi were in violation of royal instructions issued
in 1767, 1769, and 1770 which prohibited the making of any grants in the Champlain valley. 7
STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: NEW YORK LAND PATENTS 1688-1786, at 8-9 (Mary G. Nye ed.,
1947) [hereinafter 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT]. The reality was that the
handicaps of distance, slow communication and transportation which prevailed at
that time, and often the lack of a clear understanding of the actual condition on
such a vast unsettled tract of wilderness sometimes led to a miscarriage of the
intentions of the home office, and human nature being what it is, the colonial
representatives of the Crown occasionally took advantage of the opportunities
which lay before them, and granted lands in opposition to their instructions.
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Hence, when looked at in its entirety, Royal policy towards the Abenaki
was not a dead letter in the northwest corner of Vermont. The region was a
wilderness, barely surveyed. Topographically, Abenaki lands spanned the
political border. Abenaki occupied the Missisquoi River and Bay region and
white settlement was de minimis. Settlers in the pre-Revolution period
coexisted with Abenakis in a manner demonstrating that Abenaki aboriginal
title could coexist with Crown policy and the settlement that it allowed. If
anything, the Wentworth Grants' title and dominion in this period, for this
region, were "paper tigers."
3. Sovereign Acts of the Republic of Vermont
The 'Vermont Supreme Court could not have found the Abenaki aboriginal
title to the Missisquoi extinguished by actions of the government of Vermont
prior to admission to the Union in 1791.4' Primarily this is because
Vermonters never even confronted the issue of aboriginal title until 1798,
some seven years after admission to the Union. 4' Furthermore, it is doubtful
that Vermont was legally entitled to any of the sovereign powers required to
extinguish aboriginal title. Finally, the vigorous assertion of Vermont
sovereignty by the Green Mountain Boys, so relied upon by Elliot, had no
impact upon the Abenaki during the "republic" period between 1777 and
1791. Therefore, only a radical alteration of the traditional test for extinguish-
ment would have allowed Vermont to contribute to the termination of the
Abenaki's title.
a) Legislative Action
That Vermont as a republic never extinguished Abenaki title is best
evidenced by a comprehensive report made to the Vermont House of
Representatives in 1854.42 The report notes that on September 29, 1798,
representatives of the Iroquois Confederacy petitioned the Vermont legislature
for settlement of a land claim stretching from Ticonderoga to the Canadian
Id. at 10.
140. Elliot held that acts of the "Republic of Vermont" contributed to a finding that
aboriginal title was extinguished, although the court refused to say exactly who, when, or how
it was actually extinguished. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992). It did note that
Vermont's 1777 Declaration of Independence rejected all authority but its own, and declared
Vermont an autonomous "republic" in dominion over the grant lands. Id. at 216-18.
141. See infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text. The only prior reference to Indian land
requests occurred in 1781 when a group of Mohegans requested of Vermont and received a land
grant in the Marshfield land grant. In 1782, another land grant was given to these Indians. 2
RECORDS OFTHE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 127-28 (Montpelier, Vt.,
E.P. Walton, ed., Steam Press of J. & J.M. Poland 1874) [hereinafter 2 GOVERNOR & COUNCIL].
142. TIMOTHY P. REDFIELD, REPORT OF THE CLAIM OF THE IROQUOIS INDIANS UPON THE
STATE OF VERMONT FOR THEIR "HUNTING GROUND" (1854), reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OFTHE STATE OF VERMONT, OCTOBER SESSION, 1854, at 605 (EP.
Walton ed., 1855) [hereinafter REDFIELD REPORT].
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border, spanning from Lake Champlain to the spine of the Green Moun-
tains.'43 The legislature appointed an investigating legislative committee; the
committee refused to recommend a settlement, properly assessing the 1790
Nonintercourse Act as prohibiting state action." Most importantly, it
reported that "the committee... cannot ascertain whether that title has been
extinguished by purchase, conquest, dereliction of occupancy, or in any other
way whatever."'45
Therefore, the report unambiguously infers that Vermont never took an
action to extinguish aboriginal title. After receiving the report, the legislature,
with the governor and council concurring,'" passed an act 47 which validat-
ed this finding" and authorized a gubernatorial investigation of the issue
plus "a present of affection, not exceeding the value of one hundred dollars"
to the Indian representatives. 4 9
Further evidence that the "Republic of Vermont" never extinguished
aboriginal title is found in the report the following year by Governor Isaac
Tichenor 59 Given that Tichenor was part of an "oligarchy of a small but
powerful group of men who dominated Vermont politics for over two
decades,'' if the Vermont legislature had acted to extinguish aboriginal
title, clearly Tichenor would have participated in and alluded to those actions.
He did not.
143. Id. at 613.
144. Id. at 614. The committee requested Vermont Governor Isaac Tichenor to notify the
Indians that
when they shall exhibit clear and circumstantial proofs that the claim they now
make is founded on the unerring and unalterable rules of justice, and shall produce
therewith the necessary documents, authorising this state to treat with them, they
will find their brethren ready and willing to maintain inviolable the most friendly
intercourse with the Indians of the seven nations ....
Id. at 614-15.
145. Id at 614.
146. The Governor and Council were the executive branch of government until the 1830s;
see Gary J. Aichele, Making the Vermont Constitution, in A MORE PERFECT UNION: VERMONT
BECOMES A STATE, 1777-1816, at 31-33 (Michael Sherman, ed., 1991).
147. REDFIELD REPORT, supra note 142, at 615-18.
148. The Assembly focused on that part of the report that alluded to the necessity of the
Indians producing the "necessary documents" and "clear and circumstantial proofs" that the claim
rested upon a proper legal foundation. Id. at 614.
149. "And whereas, this Assembly feel a strong desire to maintain perfect peace and good
understanding with the nations above mentioned, although this claim stands entirely unsupported
by any legal or equitable proof hitherto exhibited to this Assembly .... " Id. at 616.
150. Id at 619-23. Tichenor's report is based upon inquiries-"made relative to the claims of
the seven nations of Indians of Lower Canada, in pursuance of the act of legislature on this
subject, passed at their session in October last." Id. at 619.
151. Aichele, supra note 146, at 31. His one year term as governor in 1789-90 was the only
interruption in the reign of Governor Thomas Chittenden (1777-97). Id. Tichenor was a member
of the Vermont delegation which negotiated a settlement over the land grants dispute with New
York in 1790. 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT, supra note 139, at 14.
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Instead he found that the British had not made "any express reservation of
an Indian claim" in Vermont.' Furthermore, he believed that Indian title
had been extinguished for three reasons: (1) as French allies in the French and
Indian War, the Indians lost aboriginal title to the English as a result of the
French defeat; (2) the Indians "never caused the voice of their claim to be
heard respecting these lands, during the existence of this government, or at
any period since the conquest, or since the grant of these lands by his
Britannic majesty"; and (3) as British allies during the American Revolution,
the Indians lost "all lands to the south of Canada.""' The Vermont House
of Representatives incorporated the report in an act passed in November 1799,
resolving that
the State of Vermont has taken all possible care to examine into
the merit of the claims ... and are fully of the opinion that their
claim... has long since been done away and become extinct, in
consequence of the treaty of peace in 1763 between the King of
Great Britain and the French King, and the treaty of peace
between the King of Great Britain and the United States, of which
this State is a part, in the year 1783 .... "
The 'Vermont legislature, therefore, did not rely on any action it had taken
on its own to extinguish aboriginal tifle. Its conclusion that aboriginal title
was extinguished was based upon an assessment of actions taken by Britain
and the federal government. In fact, the Vermont legislature was wrong in
concluding that the 1763 peace treaty had extinguished aboriginal title in the
Missisquoi," wrong in finding that Indian occupancy of the Missisquoi had
152. REDFiELD REPORT, supra note 142, at 619.
153. Id. at 619-21.
154. Id. at 621-22. On October, 27, 1800, Tichenor reported to the Vermont House that he
had presented the Indians a copy of the forementioned resolution. He also noted that during the
legislative session then in progress another delegation of Indians had come forward, "properly
authorized to make a final settlement of their claims." Id. at 622. This delegation was "joined by
a representation from the Abemaki [sic] nation." Id. Tichenor reported to this Indian delegation
the reasons proffered by himself and the legislature for why the Legislature decided against the
'justice of their claims." Id. at 622-23.
*A pattern developed through out the 1800s of Indian delegations coming to the legislature
seeking resolution of their claims on lands in Vermont; the legislature always offered the same
basic reasons proffered first in 1798-99. In 1812, the Iroquois complained that the legislature's
requirement of documentary proof was impossible to satisfy in light of the traditional Indian
reliance upon oral tradition. The state again relied upon the constitution and statutes of the United
States to put off the Iroquois claim. Id. at 624-30. In 1826, the legislature added a further finding
to the reasons for claiming that aboriginal title was extinguished: "[This tribe of Indians, then
or before, moved within the now limits of Canada, and have resided there ever since." JOURNAL
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 140-41 (State of Vermont 1826). The
legislature, however, still found extinguishment to have been accomplished by the Treaty of Paris
in 1783 b-tween the British and the Americans. Id.
155. See, e.g., State v. St. Francis, No. 1 171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 63-64 (Vt., Franklin Dist.
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been terminated,"s and wrong about the effect of the peace treaty ending the
Revolution."
In addition, other legislative actions taken by Vermont during this period
cannot fairly imply extinguishment."8 No act of the legislature, save the
land grant to the Mohegans in 1781, addresses Indians or aboriginal title. Acts
relating to settlement were generic in nature and were not inconsistent with
aboriginal title. Hence, Vermont did not evince a clear and unambiguous
intent to extinguish the Abenaki aboriginal title in the Missisquoi.' 9 Clearly,
the "Republic of Vermont" never extinguished the Abenaki's aboriginal title.
b) Vermont's Sovereignty
Furthermore, a serious question exists as to whether any acts of the
republic would have sufficed to extinguish Abenaki title because Vermont
could not be properly seen to be a "sovereign." The arrangement by which
Vermont received New York's support to gain admittance into the Union
seems to preclude any clear showing of Vermont's legal sovereignty. The
joint New York-Vermont commission, established to resolve the jurisdictional
dispute, recommended that upon admission to the Union, all claims of
jurisdiction on the part of New York within Vermont should end, while upon
payment of $30,000 by Vermont, all rights and titles to land within Vermont
under grants from New York would also end. On October 28, 1790, Vermont
ratified the recommendation of the commission."' Elliot admits that the very
Ct. Aug. 11, 1989). The peace between France and Britain provided for the "honorable, good,
and fair treatment of the French native American allies" such that Britain had an obligation to
protect Abenaki interests. Id. at 20-21. The British did act protectively of Abenaki interests in
the 1760s. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 31, 86-87 ("The Missisquoi
survived as a native American community in their traditional homeland throughout the existence
of the Republic of Vermont, living openly and unmolested.").
157. There is no evidence that the 1783 treaty ending the American Revolution extinguished
Abenaki aboriginal title. Furthermore, the Abenakis in Missisquoi were not unambiguously
regarded as enemies of the Americans. "The outbreak of the American Revolution found many
Native American tribes divided over which side, if either, to support. The Missisquoi were no
exception. Though most stayed out of it, some sided with the British and some with the
Americans, apparently more with the Americans." St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 27-
28. As such, the Abenakis would not have lost aboriginal title by virtue of being "losers" in the
Revolution. Id. at 86-87.
158. St. Francis looked at several acts of the Vermont legislature proffered by the State as
evidence of an intent to extinguish the aboriginal title but found them insufficient to do so. St.
Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 79. Essential to the finding was a reliance on Lipan
Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967). St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op.
at 80. Lipan held that absent convincing contrary evidence, the Republic of Texas was deemed
to have adhered to the general principles in regards to aboriginal title and the rules of
extinguishment. Lipan, 180 Ct. Cl. at 492-93. The historical record in Vermont is bereft of such
evidence.
159. St. Francis, No. 1171-10-86Fcr, slip op. at 79-91.
160. 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT, supra note 139, at 14; 14 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT:
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legitimacy of Vermont as an independent republic is still open to question.'6'
Without a legitimate status as a sovereign, actions by the "Republic of
Vermont" could not lead to extinguishment.'62
c) Vermont's Domination of the Missisquoi?
The Vermont court asserted that the military actions of the Green Mountain
Boys evidenced an intent to assert domination over all of the Wentworth
Grants' lands.'" Despite the lack of extensive civil authority," 4 clearly
there was assertion of authority in southern Vermont: "[Iln a series of
skirmishes along the old border, inhabitants of the Grants dealt roughly with
New York surveyors and other officials of Albany County who attempted to
dispossess them of their land."" The revolt of southeastern Vermonters,
LAWs OF VERMONT, 1785-1791, at 532-34 (John A. Williams ed., 1966). In January 1791, a
constitutional convention in Bennington ratified the United States Constitution, and on March 4,
1791, Congress admitted Vermont into the Union. DOYLE, supra note 86, at 60.
161. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210,218 (Vt. 1992). New York had clear legal title to the land
now encompassing Vermont, derived by the 1764 royal order, to the grants. This was dissolved
only after the $30,000 payment in 1790 and admission to the Union. 7 STATE PAPERS O
VERMONT, supra note 139, at 14.
162. Actions by Vermont between 1777 and 1791 must be overlaid upon a complex
framework. Prior to the Revolution, sovereign power obviously resided with the Crown, and its
Indian policy enunciated in the 1763 Royal Proclamation was operative. See Mohegan Tribe v.
Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 1980). As shown previously, the British did not
extinguish the Abenaki's aboriginal title.
Adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, in particular the limitation on centralized
authority included in Article IX, marked the only, and brief, departure from the policy of
centralized federal control over Indian affairs. States had control over Indian relations within their
state boundaries. Id. at 615-16. Because the peace treaty of 1783 was only between the states and
the Crown, and because as well of the clear legal title it possessed, New York must be considered
the appropriate sovereign during the Articles of Confederation period. During this period, New
York did not act to extinguish the Abenaki's title either.
As Oneida I noted, after the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, Indian law became the
exclusive province of the federal government. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414
U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (Oneida 1). Despite its 1777 declaration, after the 1781 creation of the
Articles of Confederation and the 1783 peace treaty with England, Vermont was considered by
the rest of the Union to be a part of New York, a fact made clear by the negotiations for
admission. See, e.g., Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593 (1932). During this period, New
York took no action to expressly or implicitly extinguish Abenaki aboriginal title. Nor did the
federal government.
163. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 229, 231.
164. Even those Wentworth Grants for southern Vermont that were settled had little in the
way of colonial authority exerted over them.
The basic authority in the early settlements had been that inherent in the town
charter.... Nor was any significant governing authority exercised over the Grants
by the chartering authority, New Hampshire. This was due in part to the dispute
of jurisdiction, lack of need for authority, and the decline of the New England
proprietorship system generally.
12 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAwS OF VERMONT, supra note 86, at x.
165. Aichele, supra note 146, at 6. The Green Mountain Boys were organized as "military
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capped by the arrest of New York's judicial officers at Westminster on March
14-16, 1775, destroyed the last real vestiges of New York power over
Vermont and set in motion the creation of Vermont.16
This is in sharp contrast to the absolute lack of presence by grantees and
their government in the Abenaki's aboriginal lands. Neither the creation of nor
the governance of Vermont was accomplished through the actions of white
settlers living in the northwestern corner of the state. They were simply not
a part of this action. The region would not fall under effective control of
Vermont until after Vermont's 1791 admission to the Union."6 Therefore,
without the evidence that it tried to extinguish Abenaki aboriginal title and
with the questionable sovereign power to do so, Vermont cannot be said to
have extinguished Abenaki aboriginal title during the "republic" period.
4. Vermont's Admission into the Union as the Fourteenth State
Elliot does not allude to evidence which shows that the negotiations for
Vermont's admission into the Union considered the Abenaki occupation of the
Missisquoi. Nor did the court refer to evidence indicating that the impact of
white settlement - past, present, or future - on the Abenaki was considered
in these negotiations. If it had, the court might have been correct in holding
that admission effectively "ratified" extinguishment."
These facts do not exist. Elliot departs from precedent in finding
extinguishment without identifying the congressional consideration which
clearly and unambiguously imply a ratification of extinguishment. The
complete absence of federal consideration stands in sharp comparison to
Oneida, which refused to impute ratification based upon a much stronger
showing of federal consideration. 69
companies" that were "sympathetic to the claims" of neighboring farms.
166. 1 COUNCIL & GOVERNOR, supra note 86, at 4-11; see DOYLE, supra note 86, at 12-15.
Within the year after the Westminster Massacre, the coalescing of grantees into a coherent
political body began.
167. The first Vermont surveyors did not appear in Swanton until 1787. No roads existed.
The fist settlers in the Wentworth Grant section, west Swanton, were of Dutch decent, British
loyalists who settled in both Swanton and Highgate mistakenly thinking that they were in Canada,
north of the 45th degree of latitude. The first town meeting was not held until March 23, 1790,
and only five of the more than twenty offices available were filled. No permanent white
settlements in east Swanton occurred prior to 1790. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 993-1002.
168. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 221. Elliot posited that it merely differed with St. Francis over its
application of the extinguishment test, and indeed it does try to focus upon a "sovereign consent
to extinguish aboriginal rights." Id. at 214. It held that "Vermont's admission to the Union...
[gave] final, official sanction to the previous events ...." Id. at 221. It pointed to the
preadmission negotiations in general and the 1781 congressional inquiry into fulfillment of the
grants' conditions as evidence that Congress knew it was granting Vermont full, unencumbered
title to the Wentworth Grants. Id. at 217 n.8. "There is no doubt that Congress considered and
intended the New Hampshire Grants, in 1791, to be possessory." Id. at 221.
169. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,232, 246-48 (1985) (Oneida
No. 2] 479
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
"Ratification" is subject to the canon against lightly implying extinguish-
ment of aboriginal title. 7 ' Extinguishment by statute must be shown
unequivocally by the circumstances of a statute's passage."' The historical
record clearly demonstrates that Congress was only interested in jurisdictional
disputes between Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York and is bereft of
any consideration of the Abenaki or any other Native Americans. For
example, the first petition by Vermont for recognition by the Continental
Congress, on July 24, 1776, specifically noted the conflict over titles with
New York."r Then, throughout 1777, the'newly declared "Republic of
Vermont" was unsuccessful in gaining recognition from and acceptance by the
Continental Congress because of New York's jurisdictional claims upon
Vermont." For the next thirteen years, Vermont's admission to the Union
was blocked because of jurisdictional conflicts with New York and New
Hampshire and because of the potentially destructive impact admission would
have on the territorial integrity of other states facing similar "independence"
movements. 74
Elliot finds "ratification" in Vermont's admission to the Union,17 yet there
170. See id. at 246-48. "The Court has applied similar canons of construction in nontreaty
matters. Most importantly, the Court has held that congressional intent to extinguish Indian title
must be 'plain and unambiguous." Id. at 247-48.
171. Id. at 248; Mattz v. United States, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1972) ("A Congressional
determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history.").
172. 1 COUNCIL & GOVERNOR, supra note 86, at 15-19.
173. Aichele, supra note 146, at 19.
174. In June 1778 Vermont annexed 16 New Hampshire towns on the east side of the
Connecticut River, a move that sparked New Hampshire to lay claim to all of Vermont and New
York, in order to seek confirmation of its legal claim to Vermont. Id. at 27-28; DOYLE, supra
note 86, at 35-36; James B. Wilbur, Introduction, in 3 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: JOURNALS
AND PRCCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1778-1781, pt. 1, at x (2d ed. 1974). The
Continental Congress refused to get involved, instead passing a resolution preventing the creation
of any new state out an existing one without the consent of the Continental Congress and the
legislature of the existing state. Aichele, supra note 146, at 24. By 1782, General Washington
appealed to Vermont's Governor Chittenden to withdraw its claims to New Hampshire, assuring
the governor that once the claims were removed the obstacles to admission to the Union would
also be nmoved. Id. at 29; DOYLE, supra note 86, at 47. Vermont immediately renounced these
claims ar.d reapplied for admission to the Union but was rejected for political reasons: Vermont's
expected opposition to western land claims of certain states, congressional desire to limit
Vermont's participation in the ongoing peace negotiations with Britain, and fear that the Vermont
example would spark the dismemberment of other states. Id. at 47-49.
Howaver, in 1790, even after the resolution of the New York jurisdictional dispute, Vermont's
admission to the Union hinged upon the power struggle between slave and non-slave states, big
states anI small states, and in general the territorial integrity of existing states. See 7 STATE
PAPERS OF VERMONT, supra note 139, at 13-14; DOYLE, supra note 86, at 59; Peter S. Onuf,
Vermont and the Union, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN: REFLECTIONS ON OUR PAST 189 (Jennie G.
Versteeg ed., 1987).
175. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 217 n.8, 220-21 (Vt. 1992). For example, the Vermont
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is no clear and unambiguous action during the negotiations or act of
admission which implies extinguishment. Indeed, Vermont v. New Hamp-
shire,'76 relied upon by Elliot,'" merely records the jurisdictional disputes
over state borders between the states.' However, the setting of state borders
is consistent with the existence of aboriginal title within those borders, absent
something more explicit regarding Indians.'"
Hence, the various negotiations over admission which ratified those borders
do not evidence a clear and unambiguous intent of the United States to ratify
an extinguishment of Abenaki aboriginal title within those borders."r There
is no support for the assertion by Elliot that Congress ratified extinguishment
of aboriginal title; Congress ratified the extinguishment of the jurisdictional
claims over Vermont by both New York and New Hampshire. 8' Further-
more, the 1781 admission's negotiations concerning fulfillment of the
Wentworth Grants' conditions, which Elliot relied upon, must be placed within
court concluded that "[ulpon Vermont's admission, Congress recognized the land claims based
on the representations of the grantees, which cannot be harmonized with the contention that the
grantees possessed only the 'naked fee."' Id. at 221.
176. 289 U.S. 593 (1932).
177. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 219-21.
178. Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593 (1932), involved a dispute regarding the
location of the border between them: the low-water mark of the western side of the Connecticut
River or its western bank. In order to establish the location, a historical review of the Wentworth
Grants and the conflict with New York was essential. The Court held that the low-water mark
was the border because of the explicit references to the "west side of the Connecticut River" in
the 1764 Royal Order-in-Council. Il at 597. Resolutions of Congress and the Vermont
legislature prior regarding Vermont's admission into the United States were also cited as authority
for setting the border. Id. at 600, 605, 607, 610-12, 619.
179. COHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 503 n.259 ("There is nothing inherently
inconsistent between underlying 'fee' title being in a state but subject to aboriginal Indian title.
That was the usual situation in the original states.") (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-70 (1974) (Oneida I)).
180. Nothing in Vermont v. New Hampshire or the admissions negotiations remotely touched
on matters of Indian relations or aboriginal title. When Vermonters asserted in 1781 to a
congressional committee investigating issues of admission that the conditions of the Wentworth
Grants would be fulfilled, they were merely seeking to stop both New Hampshire and New York
from succeeding in their bid to gain congressional support for their reassertion of jurisdiction over
Vermont. Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. at 608-10. Elliot claims that this "shed light on
the understanding held by both Vermont and Congress as to who had rights to the territory of
Vermont." Elliot, 616 A.2d at 217 n.8. But as Vermont v. New Hampshire makes clear, the
understanding was that the conflict at hand was between states, not between states and Indians.
These were Vermont's response to contemporaneous jurisdictional moves by New Hampshire.
Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. at 608-10.
181. On June 22, 1781, Vermont's legislature adopted a report proposing terms for
admission. On June 24, New Hampshire adopted a report claiming all of Vermont, or in the
alternative, accepting an independent Vermont that claimed jurisdiction "as far west as the
western banks of the Connecticut River and no further." Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S.
at 608-09. New Hampshire brought the jurisdictional dispute to the Continental Congress, which
resolved that each state renounce claims on the other. Id. at 609-10.
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the context of the Revolution"n and the May 1781 "not-so-secret negotia-
tions with General Frederick Haldimand, British commander at Quebec.' 3
At the same time it sought entry into the United States, Vermont was
negotiating for recognition of its independence by England, possibly as a
member of the British Empire."' Vermont's answers to inquires by the
Continental Congress can, therefore, be seen as either a threat to allow the
British to regain a strategic position reaching deep within the fragile new
American republic or simply an attempt to "shake Congress out of its chronic
lethargy. ' 'l" In any event, the negotiations do not support the proposition
that Congress ratified the extinguishment of Abenaki aboriginal title.
Oneida II supports this conclusion. In Oneida II, the Court refused to find
congressional ratification of Indian land conveyances despite references to
these conveyances in subsequent federally approved treaties."' Relying on
the canon of construction against lightly imputing extinguishment of Indian
title, the Court did not find the reference to the "last purchase" plain and
unambiguous enough, despite the fact that the last purchase was the one in
question: "The language cited. . . 'the last purchase' and... 'land heretofore
ceded,' far from demonstrates a plain and unambiguous intent to extinguish
Indian title. There is no indication that either the Senate or the President
intended by these references to ratify the 1795 conveyance."'87 Clearly, if
vague language referencing the prior Indian conveyances in question is
insufficient to impute extinguishment, then admission without reference to
Indians cannot ratify extinguishment. Vermont's admission to the Union could
not both ratify extinguishment and still follow the canon of construction and
the underlying policies of Indian law. Elliot's finding of ratification seeks to
jettison the canon of construction in favor of one which lightly imputes
extinguishment.
182. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 217 n.8. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. Vermont's
answers to the congressional inquiry are understandable when seen in this light. On October 13,
1780, the Vermont legislature passed an Act which commanded the selectmen of frontier towns
to evacuate to the interior of the state those persons who refused to aid in the defense of the
frontier. 12 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAws OF VERMONT, supra note 86, at 197. On
October 16, 1780, the "burning of Royalton by Indians under British planning and leadership,"
sparked great fears on the frontier; the "enemy threat ... caused [the] virtual evacuation of the
northern part of the state ... " 13 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAWS OF VERMONT, 1781-1784,
at xii (John A. Williams ed., 1965). Hence, Vermont's response that the grants' conditions would
be fulfilled can also be seen as a reassurance to the Continental Congress that Vermonters would
not allow a hostile British presence to maintain a foothold in the militarily important Lake
Champlain region.
183. Onuf, supra note 174, at 195.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 246 (1985) (Oneida 11).
187. Id. at 248.
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Conclusion
The Vermont Supreme Court in Elliot committed a grave miscarriage of
justice. It created a new cumulative effects test. It eliminated the need for a
clear and unambiguous sovereign act to extinguish aboriginal title. It
undermined the "guardianship" responsibility of the sovereign by requiring
that the sovereign actively protect Indian interests; the court would have
failure to do so henceforth evidence implicit consent to extinguish those
interests. The court eliminated the canon against lightly imputing extinguish-
ment by finding ratification in congressional actions which did not concern
aboriginal title and which were not inconsistent with the exercise of aboriginal
title.
Elliot is therefore a radical departure from the rules of aboriginal title. It
undermines the well-settled policies that have long inspired Indian law. In
light of the problems related to the issuance of title insurance in northwestern
Vermont, it seems like an expedient solution, warranted not by the facts but
by the exigencies of the moment. Ironically, it was the inability of states to
uniformly apply principles of justice in their Native American relations that
prompted the rules of law and centralized control which Elliot so radically
undermines.
The Elliot decision's reach is much further than Vermont. Had Elliot
defined the rules of extinguishment, it is quite possible that all of the eastern
land claims by Indian nations from Oneida I in 1974 to the present would
have been extinguished.' According to Bob Anderson, staff attorney with
the Native American Rights Fund, had Elliot been the law prior to Oneida I,
the Oneida would not have won that case. 9 Lawrence Aschenbrenner,
another staff attorney with the Fund, added that should the United States
Supreme Court eventually endorse the Elliot test, it would "have a damaging
effect, a real damaging effect on any one of the other [outstanding] land
claims," because courts "can find a lot of excuses" and "acts inconsistent with
the existence of aboriginal title, such as when they just ignore it."'' Both
attorneys note that the practical effect of the Court denying certiorari to Elliot
will be to send a message to other courts that this is the means to get around
"sticky Indian land claims.' 9'
188. For a survey of eastern Indian land claims, see Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 116;
RICHARD S. JONES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIANS: LAND CLAIMS BY EASTERN
TRIBES (1987); Note, Indian Sovereignty and Eastern Indian Land Claims, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 921 (1982). According to Lawrence Aschenbrenner, Staff Attorney with the Native
American Rights Fund, Elliot is "certainly inconsistent" with Oneida II in finding implicit
extinguishment. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Aschenbrenner, Staff Attorney, Native
American Rights Fund (Jan. 19, 1993).
189. Telephone Interview with Bob Anderson, supra note 10.
190. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Aschenbrenner, supra note 188.
191. Id.; see also State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992).
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The effect on the Abenaki is likewise significant. Immediately after the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, tribal leaders complained of increased
harassment by Vermont law enforcement officials." Vermont began
prosecuting Abenakis for the exercise of aboriginal fishing rights and alleged
violations of motor vehicles laws.' However, the Vermont district court
judge with jurisdiction decided to dismiss these charges, noting the "petty"
nature of the violations, a court docket full of more serious offenses, and
efforts by Vermont and Abenaki leaders to resolve disputes through
dialogue.94
Because of the injustice of the decision itself and the dangerous precedent
that it will tend to set, Elliot should have been granted certiorari and reversed
by the United States Supreme Court.95 Although the Court denied certiorari,
it should limit the reach of Elliot by taking the first available opportunity to
strongly reaffirm its past aboriginal title holdings. Furthermore, the Court
should consider clarifying the law of extinguishment by adopting a test which
is not as prone to abuse and manipulation. One source for such a test is found
in United States v. Dion,'" where the Court adopted an "actually considered"
and "chose to" abrogate the test for treaty abrogations. 9' This test provides
for certain safeguards in its requirements for "clear evidence" and actual
consideration and choice.' It is consistent with the canon against lightly
192. See Letter of Complaint from Michael Delaney, Tribal Judge, Sovereign Republic of
the Abenaki Nation of Missisquoi, to Shelly Hill, Professional Conduct Board (Dec. 31, 1992)
(charging that the Franklin County State Attorney had engaged in illegal harassment, selective
prosecution, and a conspiracy to institute criminal charges against Abenaki Nation Chief Homer
St. Francis) (on file with author).
193. See Michael Delaney, Tribal Judge, Sovereign Republic of the Abenaki Nation of
Missisquoi, Press Release (Jan. 26, 1993) (challenging the commencement of the prosecution of
fifty seven Abenakis for the exercise of aboriginal rights and charging that the state was
threatening the physical and cultural survival of the Abenaki people) (on file with author).
194. See State Notes, Judge to Dismiss 77 Cases Involving Abenaki, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS (Burlington Vt.), May 1, 1993, at B1; see also Editorial, Progress for Abenakis,
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Burlington Vt.), July 3, 1992, at A10; Yvonne Daley, Commission
Wants Meeting on Abenaki Ruling, RUTLAND DAILY HERALD (Rutland Vt.), June 26, 1992, at 14.
195. See State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992).
196. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
197. Id. at 739-40. "What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty." Id.
198. For a discussion of Dion and the "actual consideration and choice" test as applied to
the abrogation of Indian treaties by federal statutes protecting the environment, see Laurence,
supra note 53. Laurence concludes that Indian advocates should "feel reasonably comfortable"
with the test because of these safeguards; the test "should remove from a court's concern
argument-, about what Congress is imputed to have known, or what it should have known, or
what it constructively knew, or what it might have done had it been brought to its attention that
a treaty abrogation was threatened." Id. at 865-66. Laurence argues that Dion still provides a
measure of flexibility which may wrongly be used to impute abrogation where none was intended,
but concludes that it still may be protective enough of treaties if used skillfully used by tribal
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imputing extinguishment. It is a more precise formulation than that currently
in operation. Clearly, as the treaty abrogation cases that rely upon Dion prove,
an even more protective test which would require express references to
aboriginal title extinguishment would be the most preferable choice of
tests.' ' Yet in light of the manipulations by Elliot, a decision by the Court
to firm up the language protecting aboriginal title seems not only just and in
order, but also well within the bounds of the most recent articulations on the
subject by the Court.
advocates. Id. at 866-86. However, in regards to aboriginal title, the Dion test provides
significantly more precision than current articulations.
199. Id. at 864, 868-85.
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